The Privatization of New Zealand Rail Part 1: Assessment of History Markets and Data by The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc.
Report to The Treasury
C O N F I D E N T I A L
EMBARGOED UNTIL 11.30am 4th AUGUST 1999
The Privatisation of New Zealand Rail
Part 1
Assessment of History, Markets and Data
Prepared by: New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc.
22 July 1998, revised 10 July 1999
New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc.
LOCATION : Kelburn campus of Victoria University of Wellington
Room 318/9 Old Kirk Building
CONTACT : OK 319
Private Bag 600
Wellington
Tel : + 64 4 463 5562
Fax : + 64 4 463 5566
Email : iscr@vuw.ac.nz
Website : http://www.iscr.org.nz
Members
Contact Energy Limited
Ministry of Commerce
Natural Gas Corporation
New Zealand Post Limited
Reserve Bank of New Zealand
Telecom Corporation of New Zealand Limited
The New Zealand Treasury
Transpower New Zealand Limited
Victoria University of Wellington
Structure and Personnel
The New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation Inc. was
established in February 1998 to conduct empirical and conceptual; research on
competition and regulatory issues.  It has a broad mandate to conduct research in any area
of organisations and markets that are determined to be of interest.  The central area of
expertise is economics but other subjects, such as law are important to many of the
ISCR's projects.  The research outputs are available on the ISCR website.  ISCR also
produce seminars on its research.
The ISCR Team on this Project
Project Leader Professor Lewis Evans (Executive Director: ISCR)
Consulting Economist Mr David Boles de Boer (Project Member: ISCR, Level
6 Ltd)
Transport Industry Specialist Dr Jagadish C Guria*
Quality Assurance Associate Professor Margaret Walls
Research support Ms Katherine Lee Gray
Ms Ingrid Shouler
• * Not privy to Tranz Rail data
Acknowledgment:
This report was prepared under a grant from the NZ Treasury.
Without the full commitment from the subject organisation a review such as this would
not be as rich in either data or insights into the way the privatisation evolved.  Tranz Rail
have been exceptional in their support, in providing unrestricted access to information
and physical facilities.
CONTENTS
Introduction
1 Introduction - Study Objectives ........................................................................ 1
Methodology
2 Methodology ..................................................................................................... 3
2.1 The Approach............................................................................................ 3
2.2 This Report................................................................................................ 3
Precis
3 Precis - Stage 1.................................................................................................. 5
Historical Review and Analysis
4 A Brief History.................................................................................................. 8
The Environment
5 Background and Environment Review ........................................................... 10
5.1 Political Economy ................................................................................... 10
5.2 Economic Overview................................................................................ 12
5.3 Road Transport Deregulation .................................................................. 12
5.4 Competitive Product Markets.................................................................. 14
5.5 Use of Technology and Labour............................................................... 15
Organisational Review
6 Organisational Review .................................................................................... 18
Markets and Competition
7 Markets and Competition ................................................................................ 26
Labour and Technology
8 Labour and Technology .................................................................................. 48
Financial Performance
9 Financial Performance..................................................................................... 56
Rail Efficiency
10 Railway Efficiency...................................................................................... 64
Privatisation and The IPO
11 Privatisation of NZ Rail and the IPO .......................................................... 67
Counterfactual
12 Counterfactual: In General .......................................................................... 72
12.1 Measurement of Welfare......................................................................... 75
Conclusions and Recommendations
13 Stage 1 Conclusions and Recommendations............................................... 80
13.1 The Counterfactual .................................................................................. 82
13.2 Recommendations ................................................................................... 84
Bibliography............................................................................................................ 85
Introduction
11 Introduction - Study Objectives
The Treasury requested tenders for an empirical evaluation of the impact on the New
Zealand economy of the privatisation of NZ Rail Limited, now Tranz Rail Ltd.
Their terms of reference were to:
• determine the nature and extent of the economic welfare gains and
losses resulting from the privatisation
• identify which groups have gained or lost,
• estimate the quantum of the gains or losses, and
• analyse in depth the decision and consequences of the privatisation.
The aim of the review is to determine whether the privatisation of NZ rail was in the
public interest and to provide input to examinations of welfare changes associated
with privatisation more broadly.
Methodology
32 Methodology
The terms of reference were that the full study should be conducted in 2 stages and that both
stages should be based upon the methodology of cost-benefit analysis. In addition, there
should, in the first stage, be a strategic and industry analysis that places the evaluation of
privatisation in a perspective that enables the key determining features of the measured
outcomes to be identified. The methodology of “cost-benefit analysis” is more or less that
which is described in the Review of Methodologies for Estimating the Welfare Impacts of
Corporatisation and Privatisation (the Review).
2.1 The Approach
In conducting its evaluation, ISCR adopts the cost benefit approach to evaluation, bearing in
mind that the evaluation is ex post, whereas standard cost-benefit analysis is conducted on an
ex ante basis. The ISCR evaluation follows the broad guiding principles of the Review, but
not slavishly.  It is not proposed to expend effort on financial ratio analysis excepting in the
problematic event that it can lead to interpretable performance benchmarking. In addition, the
nature of the market (the extent of competition, for example) will be carefully taken into
account in the design of the specific measures and techniques used in the productivity and
cost-benefit calculations.
While the ISCR methodology of the cost-benefit calculation is well illustrated by the study of
Boles de Boer and Evans (“The Economic Efficiency of Telecommunications in a
Deregulated Market: the case of New Zealand”, The Economic Record, 72, 24-35, 1996), it
was necessary to develop specific aspects of the work to fit the key characteristics of the rail
transport industry.  In particular, the specific political, regulatory and competitive
environments within which NZ railways functioned prior to privatisation have been  quite
different to Telecom New Zealand. The strategic and industry analysis will lay the basis for
the particular method of implementation in the evaluation.
In order to address the overall goal of the study, the evaluation is a little more explicit about
the need to understand the alternative competing modes of transport than is suggested in the
scope of Stage 1. Alternative modes affect the regulatory and competitive environment and
these, in turn, importantly affect strategic decisions and performance. They also affect the
specific techniques used in cost-benefit analysis (see Evans’ comments on the Review).
It was agreed that at the conclusion of Stage 1 ISCR would report to The Treasury its
assessment of what can be achieved and what is appropriate for the measurement of the
incidence of costs and benefits of privatisation. It would then consult with the Treasury in
order to determine an agreed approach to the assessment of the incidence of benefits and
costs.
2.2 This Report
This is the final report for the stage one review and provides ISCR conclusions and
recommendations on a structured approach to stage two.
Precis
53 Precis - Stage 1
Market Share As a result of deregulation overall freight and passenger market
share steadily declined until 1993 when NZ Rail Ltd. was sold to
Tranz Rail Holdings.  For a variety of reasons it is difficult to assess
market share, however between 1983 and 1993 about one half of
rail’s long haul market share went to their competitors.
Financial Partly because of the market consequences, rail’s financial
performance was a disaster.  Revenues were halved and by 1989
large operating losses and interest on investments generated a debt
of $1.2 billion that could not be sustained.
Restructuring Restructuring entailed significant investment, layoffs of rail staff
and a dedicated focus on the core business of rail that required high
quality management and sharp incentives for them.
1989 Position The crisis came to a head in 1988
• its market position had been drastically reduced by
competition.
• it had an uncompetitive cost structure
• it lacked the strategy and the capability to succeed.
• it had diversified into property to a small extent and this
had detracted from its focus on its core business.
 
 Ownership In late 1988 it was decided that NZ needed a viable rail system and
if it was to survive, the core rail business should be privately held.
In 1989 a plan to ready the company for privatisation was put into
place.
 
 Core Rail Business Organisational, financial and cost restructuring in 1990 led to the
creation of a “saleable” core rail business, however for a number of
reasons rail’s deteriorating performance in their product markets did
not stabilise until 1993.
 
 Privatisation The sale of NZ Rail Limited to TranzRail for $400m coincided with
an improvement in both market share and financial performance.
These improvements came from a successful marketing strategy
targeted at the long haul of bulk commodities and in the distribution
of door-to-door goods.
 
 Performance Passenger services have shown a turnaround in demand volumes
and financial performance, while operational efficiency has been
improved significantly.  This has been achieved through shedding
(mainly staff) costs, implementing service enhancing customer and
operational systems as well as targeting technology investments.
 
 Counterfactual In the 110 year period prior to 1993, rail’s performance under a
number of corporate organisational forms did not lead to a viable
business.  If public ownership had continued past 1993, then, given
management of rail since 1880 and the deregulation of all modes of
transport since 1984, the counterfactual would be at best captured
6for the long term by Trans Rail having a break even economic
surplus.
 
 
 Stage 2 Recommendations
 
 Stage 2 Proceed with stage 2
 
 Data Data and information are available and are of very satisfactory
quality for studies of this sort.
 
 Segmentation Use a segmented multiple output market approach for outputs
 
 Counterfactual
• Start with the 1993 surplus and deterioration from that date
onwards until break even is reached
• Breakeven from some date such as 1998.
Privatisation Decision Evaluate the economic efficiency of the 1988 decision to invest
capital, restructure and privatise the company.
Historical Review and Analysis
84  A Brief History
Railways Dept The business now conducted by Tranz Rail Holdings Limited and
its subsidiaries can be traced back to the construction and
development of the original railway network in New Zealand
beginning in the late 1870's.  The Railways Department controlled
all freight and passenger railway operations in New Zealand for
much of the first three quarters of this century, and from 1962 it
also operated a ferry service between the North and South Islands.
Railways Corp In 1982 the Railways Department and the InterIsland ferry service
were formed into a Government-owned corporation named New
Zealand Railways Corporation. Following a 1983 operational
review by Booz Allen, the Corporation internally restructured the
railway and ferry operations to conduct business more efficiently.
The goal of the restructuring was to lower costs and compete
strongly for freight business by means of investing in modern plant,
developing the property side of the business and reorganising
management accountabilities into lines of business.  Also
diversification from core business was proposed.   Much of the
restructuring was driven by the deregulation of ports, sea and,
particularly, the road transport of freight and passengers.
NZ Rail Limited In 1990 New Zealand Rail Limited was incorporated as a limited
liability company wholly owned by the Government.  The
Government transferred all of its rail and ferry assets and related
liabilities to NZ Rail Ltd. and restructured the rail balance sheet by
writing off approximately $1.2bm of debt accumulated during the
1980’s.  Other non-core assets (mainly property) remained with the
Railways Corporation for disposal.  The Government retained
ownership of the land on which the rail assets were situated and
leased the land to New Zealand Rail Limited.  The creation of NZ
Rail in 1990 was accompanied by a further internal reorganisation
of management.
Tranz Rail NZ Ltd. New Zealand Rail was purchased in September 1993 by Tranz Rail
Holdings.  Tranz Rail’s principal shareholders included affiliates of
Wisconsin Central Transportation Corporation; Berkshire Partners
LLC; and Fay, Richwhite & Company.  In 1995 New Zealand Rail
Limited became Tranz Rail Limited and in 1996 the Company went
public, listing on the New Zealand Stock Exchange.  The listing was
accompanied by a “re-branding” of the internal lines of business
into business units and a tight focus on service and customers.
The Environment
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5 Background and Environment Review
This section is most important because the fortunes of Rail in the 1980’s were almost entirely
at the mercy of a range of market forces at work in New Zealand.  Rail had always served
varying mixtures of commercial and social goals and through its history was unable to take
charge of its own destiny.
This history, and especially the period from 1980 onwards, is a significant factor in the
approach that was taken to its privatisation.  Left on its own to survive in a deregulated
environment rail had to restructure what was left of the past and make a commercially viable
business.  As will be seen, deregulation of the freight market had a major effect, and was
almost the sole determinant of the performance of the Railways Corporation.  In fact, it very
nearly led to the Corporation’s collapse.
This section therefore describes the background, and the sources of the changes that took
place in rail from 1983.  The sources of change fell broadly into three categories, as follows:
• political economy which shook the industrial structure of New
Zealand in the 1980’s and initiated widespread economic
restructuring.
• less regulation of industry combined with open, competitive
product markets.
• excess resource levels within the rail business, relative to the
outputs they delivered: railways were over-resourced and had to
change.
 
5.1 Political Economy
 State Involvement Traditionally, in New Zealand, the State has had a very active and
major role to play in the nation’s economic affairs.  Particularly
since the 1930s, the economy had been heavily regulated.
Intervention included among other things, state provision of goods
and services, the detailed regulation of economic activity (including
decisions on production and pricing) and import and foreign
exchange controls.  Government ownership was also extensive and
included banking, insurance, health, education, transport, energy
and utilities (Evans et al, 1996).
 
 Slow Change From the 1960s, and particularly from Britain’s entry to the EEC in
1973, the economy was viewed as under performing and agitation
for a change in direction grew. The National Government during the
1970s in finance and in the early 1980’s in transport made tentative
moves towards deregulation.  Deregulation during this period was
particularly slow and according to Bollard & Buckle (1987) the
outcome was a mix of regulatory reform and further intervention.
During the latter part of National Government rule in the 1980s,
regulatory measures were enforced in financial systems and a price
freeze was applied.  Although the foundation for land transport
deregulation had been laid while the National Government was in
power, their later term, to 1984, cannot be seen as a period of
deregulation.
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 1984 Election The 1984 general election brought the National Government’s
three-term rule to an end.  The Labour Government, successors to
National, brought not only a change in political leadership but
established a range of major reforms.  Their aim was to achieve a
competitive environment in which markets could operate freely
from intervention by government, (Evans et al:1996), and
redistribution would be managed through the tax, health, education
and social welfare programmes.
 
 The reform period is described by Evans et al (1996). It included the
introduction of the revised competition statutes with the Commerce
Act 1986; and major restructuring of the state sector (Boston &
Holland:1987).  Regulatory reforms were implemented in the
energy and transport sectors as well.
 
 SOE’s Restructuring the State sector meant that there were major reforms
to Government departments and trading departments were
converted into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs).  The 1986 State
Owned Enterprises Act required each SOE to function as a business
with clear commercial objectives, and established a Board of
Directors who were accountable to the Minister of Finance and
another shareholding minister .  By 1987 there were 14 SOEs  and
by 1992 27 had been formed.  According to Evans et al (1996) there
existed differences between SOEs and privately owned firms, that
led or would lead to performance problems of SOEs relative to
privatised companies.  Awareness of these provided the impetus for
privatization which commenced in 1987 with the partial
privatisation of The Bank of New Zealand.
 
 Further legislation aided reform.  In April 1988, the State Sector Act
was passed and a year later the Public Finance Act 1989, which
gave government departments clearer management goals and
greater management independence to carry out their agreed
functions.
 
 The 1990’s The year 1990 saw yet further political changes with the end of the
fourth Labour Government and the beginning of the fifth National
Government.  With the foundations laid by Labour for a deregulated
economy, National continued in much the same way, though at a
slower rate.  In 1991 the Employment Contracts Act was
introduced, which abolished compulsory unionism, facilitated
employer-employee individual contracts and ended centralized
wage setting.
 
 Overall, the period from 1984 until the early 1990’s saw dramatic
and wide reaching changes to all sectors of the economy which have
contributed to a much less regulated economic environment.
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5.2 Economic Overview
 
 Pre 1984 New Zealand’s economic position, leading up to the 1984 election,
was not strong.  Public and private sector foreign debt combined,
rose from 11 percent of GDP to 95 per cent between March 1974 to
June 1984, and similarly net public debt increased from 5 percent of
GDP to 32 per cent during the same period.  Annual inflation was
high throughout the whole period of December 1973 to March
1983.  Consequently in April 1983, New Zealand’s AAA credit
rating was downgraded to AA+ on sovereign external debt (Evans
et al, 1996).
 
 These factors led to the reforms described above.  According to
Boston and Dalziel (1992) it was almost universally accepted that
inconsistent macroeconomic policies in the 1970’s and early 1980’s
had contributed largely to the economic crisis in 1984.  However,
economic growth throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s has been
variable.  There was negligible growth in the recession of the 1988-
1992 period.
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 1987 Crash Following the stock market crash of 1987, economic growth for
1988 fell dramatically and in the following two years New Zealand
faced negative growth.  The graph indicates New Zealand’s GDP
growth over this period to the present day.
 
 
5.3 Road Transport Deregulation
 Deregulation of the road transport industry in New Zealand began
in 1983 with the removal of road transport licensing.  Prior to this,
the industry had been heavily regulated since the nineteenth
13
century, with government owning and regulating major transport
operations in all modes.  In order to protect Government railways
against increasing road competition and for the asserted reason of
establishing price stability in the freight transport industry, a
restriction on the length of haul for road freight was introduced in
1936.  The restriction, which applied to almost all goods, began at
30 miles and was increased to 150 km in 1977.
 
 Licensing Quantitative licensing also regulated the heavy freight transport
industry by simply restricting the issue of licenses, making it
difficult for those wishing to enter the industry.  New entrants not
only had to prove that there was a need for their services, but also
that they would not disadvantage existing operators. Operational
efficiency was affected by reduced competition from regulatory
“tagging” of freight movements to a company, route, area and/or
commodity.  Under this regulatory combination, rail faced very
limited competition for long distance freight traffic.  Where
competition did exist between road and rail (i.e. less than 150 km
and for exempt goods), road transport rates were within limits
prescribed by the Ministry of Transport (MOT) that were
determined on a cost-plus basis.
 
 In New Zealand, the 1980’s saw rapid political and economic
change, as well as advances in global transport technology.
According to the MOT (1995), these changes “made Government
ownership and control of transport philosophically unacceptable and
operationally impractical” (Ministry of Transport 1995:8).
 
 Legislation In November 1983 the Transport Amendment Act (No 2) began the
deregulation phase in New Zealand’s road freight transport.  There
were two notable changes to the operation of the industry, firstly the
quantitative road transport licensing system was replaced with a
qualitative system on June 1 1984 so that the main issue of concern
was the fitness of the applicant to run a trucking service, and
secondly the 150 km restriction on road carriage began to be phased
out.
 
 Although the route, distance and price constraints had been
removed on 1 November 1983 under the Transport Amendment Act
(1983), where road haulage was in competition with railways
beyond 150 km distance, operators were still required to pay for a
permit from the Ministry of Transport.  This phased withdrawal of
the 150 km restriction meant that operators were still charged for a
permit but on a per tonne-day basis.  When these permits were
completely phased out in October 1986, entry to road transport
became totally unrestricted.
 
 In parallel with this, the removal of import restrictions facilitated
the importation of secondhand trucks and reduced trucking costs
more generally.
 
 
 Ports and Shipping As part of the general economic reform and the reduction of the
level of intervention, the Government identified the need for major
reform in both ports and the shipping industry.  The port operations
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were viewed as costly, inefficient, overstaffed and plagued by
industrial disruption.   Two priorities were established as a result of
the On Shore Costs Study (Ministry of Transport:1984).  These
were to change the way in which various statutory authorities
operated on and around the waterfront, and to normalise
employment procedures.
 
 The Ports Reform Bill, introduced in 1987, provided for the
corporatisation of the regional harbour boards and the Ports
Companies Act 1988 led to the formation of separate port
companies in each port.  The New Zealand Ports Authority was also
abolished during 1988.  In 1989 ownership of the port companies
was initially transferred to the new regional local government
bodies but since then four port companies have been listed on the
New Zealand Stock Exchange.
 
 Waterfront reform The second priority of normalising employment arrangements
began with the 1989 Waterfront Industry Reform Bill which
abolished the Waterfront Industry Commission that administered
the labour pool for waterside employees engaged by various
stevedoring companies or container terminal operators. The original
expensive pool system that still exists in Australia was replaced
with normal employer/employee relations associated with
permanent company employment.  Other reforms such as the 1991
Employment Contracts Act affected all industries equally.
 
 Air Transport Although air transport was deregulated about this time it can be
regarded as a separate market from rail.  There would however be
some substitution between these markets in passenger transport,
particularly for inter island passenger transport.
 
 
5.4 Competitive Product Markets
 Market Changes Immediately following deregulation of rail’s product markets,
significant changes took place within the transport industry, some of
which were expected, some quite unexpected.  As will be seen the
impact on rail business was dramatic.  Because of the lifting of
restrictions on road, a price war between road and rail freight
operators broke out and freight rates declined for both modes of
transport.   Deregulation now permitted truckers to enter and leave
the road transport industry reasonably freely, so rates were
established by customers who used rate quotes to play one freight
operator off against another, encouraging the lowest cost/most
efficient operators to set the market price.  Indeed, such is the cost
structure for trucking that it comes close to being a perfectly
contested market.  Entry and exit are both at low cost.  The analysis
in this report treats road transport as a fully competitive industry
from 1988.
 
 Although competition and price declines occurred during the 1980’s
these intensified during the 1990’s, coinciding with the increased
importation of second hand trucks.
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 Market Impacts Coupled with the price reductions, competition in long distance
traffic arose, i.e. traffic beyond 150 km.  As will be seen, both
tonnes and tonne-kilometres of freight carried by rail started
declining and both declining trends continued to the mid 1990’s.
Frith & Guria (1995)  suggest that during the period after
deregulation there was a shift in rail towards longer hauls with
evidence for this shown in increasing average haul distances.
 
 A more detailed analysis of the market and financial impact of
deregulation is described in section 4.2 of this report.
 
 To a somewhat lesser extent, coastal shipping also competes with
rail.  The New Zealand shipping industry has undergone a number
of changes during recent times. It has also faced different types of
intervention, for example, at one time Government regulation of
coastal shipping forced operators to use locally surveyed vessels,
and to employ New Zealand crews at local wage rates.  One notable
difference between land transport and sea however, is that shipping
has not always been subject to quantity regulations.
 
 Shipping Efficiency The restructuring of the ports and shipping industry has resulted in a
more competitive coastal shipping sector.   Staffing numbers of
coastal vessels dropping between 20-40% between 1989 and 1992
allowed real shipping rates to also drop and an increase in the
number of operators in the coastal shipping industry in the 1990’s
resulted.  It is estimated that there are about 10 different New
Zealand shipping operators involving around 19 vessels transporting
a range of general cargo, passengers, vehicles, petroleum products
and cement along New Zealand’s coasts.
 
 With the introduction of the 1995 Maritime Transport Bill, foreign
vessels coming to New Zealand in the normal course of their
business are able to carry goods and passengers between New
Zealand ports, adding yet another competitive layer to the coastal
shipping sector.  The volume shipped around the coast remained
static and has had a peculiar, largely unchanged composition.
Nevertheless as its shipments of coal exemplifies, coastal shipping
does provide a competitive discipline in a number of product
markets for both road and rail transport.  As with road transport,
entry and exit does not entail significant sunk costs and thus
provides viable actual and potential competition.
 
 
5.5 Use of Technology and Labour
 Rail Operations At the same time as transport deregulation was being implemented
the Board of New Zealand Rail commisioned a number of strategic,
marketing and operations studies.  The initial diagnostic review by
Booz, Allen & Hamilton (1983) (BAH) provides a summary of the
situation Rail were in with regard to their use of labour and
technology as compared to modern transport practices.   They
concluded that NZ rail would be seriously challenged by the
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deregulation of the market in November and that the infrastructure,
equipment, work practices and staffing were at levels well in excess
of that required to meet the levels of business existing in 1983, or
that which could be expected in the future environment when the
company was no longer protected from competition in long-haul
traffic.
 
 Investments BAH also recommended that Rail invest in new infrastructure and
that they target improvement of their economic advantage, namely
their ability to move a large volume of freight per train on average.
 
 Recommendations Specific recommendations were as follows:
 
• Significantly increase train sizes (which necessitated
investment in couplers, draft gear and passing loops).
• Reduce the wagon fleet by nearly two thirds (requiring
investment in larger wagons and improving wagon utilisation).
• Reduce the locomotive fleet by nearly one half.
• Adjust the workshops to match the reduced workloads as a
result of less equipment to maintain.
• Reduce rail freight staffing levels by approximately 40% from
more than 20,000.
As will be seen the impact of the changes on infrastructure and
labour was immense.
Organisational Review
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6 Organisational Review
Overview At the time of privatisation, NZ Rail was a Government owned
limited liability company, organised into lines of business for
managerial accountability.  The lines of business or business groups
had been used internally in one form or another since it was
reorganised in 1984.  This managerial reorganisation was the first
of several leading up to privatisation but it was probably the most
important.  Before a post-1983 review is undertaken, it is
appropriate to consider the long political and organisational history
that Rail has had in New Zealand.
The Organisational Structure of New Zealand Railways in
its First 120 Years
It is of more than passing interest to consider the organisational
structures of New Zealand railways from its earliest days. The re-
organisational changes that have taken place, the reasons for them,
and the outcomes are of direct utility in establishing the
counterfactual to privatisation.
5 Structures While for much of the past 120 years New Zealand rail has been a
government department under direct instruction of a minister, there
were 5 attempts at establishing a corporate, or management board
form. These were:
1889-1894 Railways Corporation
1925-1928 Railways Board of Management
1931-1936 Railways Board
1953-1956 Railways Commission
1983- Railways Corporation
The precise structure of the first four organisational entities are
described by Orr (1981) who draws out principles from his, and
others, examination of these corporate episodes. The setting up of
corporate structures was typically symptomatic of the state of the
railways. For example, Orr reports,
“In 1880 the Civil Service Commission produced a scathing report
on the Railways Department and it led to the setting up of a Royal
Commission to investigate these criticisms. The Royal
Commission’s recommendations included reductions in staff,
wages, train mileages and railway construction –”
1980 Review By 1980 the familiar pattern of the previous 100 years had emerged.
Deteriorating quality and financial position of the railways would
precipitate a review that typically concluded that the railways
should be run more as a business at arms length from political
influence. Following the review some corporate form would be put
in place that implemented recommendations.  But progress was not
maintained in part because of continuing political decision making,
and this was reflected in the abandonment of corporate forms at the
change of government.
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Cross Subsidies There were periods where the railways was used to cross-subsidise
a number of activities and was starved of maintenance resources. It
was generally subject to politically managed price control.  The
actual profitability of its core business over this period is difficult to
determine because of the price control and various uneconomic
activities that the railways were called upon to provide. But what is
clear is that it struggled to be financially viable, even though from
1933 it had statutory protection from competition from road
transport. Also, the evidence is that the reviews and subsequent
corporate forms all had the objective of making rail a viable
business.
Organisational New Zealand railways has had episodes of organisational
Restructure restructuring and revitalised investment, maintenance and staffing,
in between which it has had a very bureaucratic structure that was
under direct political influence. The fact that the corporate forms did
not continue is indicative of unstable objectives for New Zealand
Railways in public ownership. On the basis of aggregate financial
data for the railways Orr (1981, p24 and 22) concludes that the
corporate forms, relative to departmental forms, had been a success,
but that their success and tenure was limited by their continued
political dominance. The 1983 Railways Corporation was
established after the period of Orr’s (1981) analysis. Because it was
never converted to a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) under the 1986
State Owned Enterprise Act but remained directly accountable to
the Minister of Transport until its sale in 1993, history seems to
have been repeating itself.  In respect of performance only, Rail was
required to report to the SOE minister.
Political Influence The history of New Zealand rail suggests that the political
connection has materially influenced rail’s performance and
inhibited attaining business performance objectives, except for
particular episodes. It also suggests that the reviews and corporate
episodes were in response to emerging problems and that they were
focussed on attaining a viable business: there is no emphasis in
these reviews placed on expanding the political, or social tasks rail
was providing. This strongly suggests that where rail is not to carry
political tasks, but is to perform at its core business that its best
chance of success is for it to be separated from political control as
much as possible.
In short, history tells us that past indifferent financial performance
of New Zealand rail has occurred despite prohibitions on entry to
certain rail markets.  It resulted from price control and from poor
performance of the core business, independently of any non-
business tasks it was required to carry out. It also indicates that
corporate forms have improved performance but they have not been
sustainable under government ownership. There is no reason
whatsoever, to assume that the future under government ownership
would be any different.  The SOE model is the most determined
attempt this century by the government to establish well-functioning
state-owned businesses.  While the model is not fully tested, the
political connection and monitoring issues remain for these entities.
20
The history of rail will influence the choice of counterfactual to
privatisation.
NZ Rail Corporation 1983 to 1990
BAH Report The 1983 Booz Allen report had highlighted the weaknesses of the
“pre-lines of business structure” where three senior officers
reported to the General Manager and were responsible for a range
of activities rather than specific outcomes.  BAH maintained that
the impending road transport deregulation required a structure with
less political involvement and a commercial focus.  The following
managerial structure was set up inside the Crown Corporation legal
structure that had existed from 1982.
New Zealand Railway Corporation 1984-1990
Rail Properties
Railtech
Communications
InterIslander
Railnet
Transtech
RailFreight Systems 
Intercity
Speedlink
Cityline
Passenger Services Corporate
Chief Executive
Accountability The 1984 changes were significant in the context of a report such as
this because they overcame many of the managerial accountability
issues that can cause inefficient economic performance in public
enterprises.  In terms of the “performance improving formula” that
is applied to public corporations, the 1984 managerial changes
delivered improved internal performance from a business point of
view, 10 years ahead of the ownership changes.  The 1984 changes
not only allowed the business lines to focus on markets and their
own specific performance but also encouraged the management of
network operations to focus on the significant performance
improvements that were required by the Booz Allen report to be
delivered from that part of the business.
Unfortunately, management’s understanding of and reaction to the
deregulation of the freight market was inadequate. They could do
little for nearly 10 years to halt the decline in market share and
financial performance.
Transfer Pricing Market segment orientated business groups inside RailFreight
Systems were formed in 1988 to focus more sharply on the market
share losses in particular markets.  To improve performance
business groups transfer priced their services out to each other and
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were accountable for their “contribution” to the Corporation.  While
transfer pricing arrangements are often expensive and distracting in
these circumstances, they were probably useful in directing
managerial behaviour towards meeting customer needs and placing
pressure on individual and group performance.  For market and
operational reasons, other internal changes were made to the
management structure in the period to 1990 but none were as
significant as the full corporatisation that took place at that time.
NZ Rail Corporation 1990 Onwards
The Core Business The 1990 corporatisation represented the culmination of a number
of reviews, that considered operational, financial and organisational
dimensions. The basic need to be more responsive to the market and
to have an efficient rail operation drove the changes.  With
privatisation a possibility, work had been undertaken by
government and company management to identify the “core”
business of the railways and it was these freight moving functions
that formed the basis of NZ Rail Limited.  InterIsland services as
well as both long distance and local passenger rail services were
also included in the new company.  Non core business such as
property, buses and parcels were left in the Railway Corporation as
was ownership of the land the rails sat on.  The legal restructure of
1990 followed with a financial restructuring that saw accumulated
debts of $1billion retained in the old Rail Corp, a write down of the
asset values into the new “books” of NZ Rail Ltd and an equity
injection of $360m into the company.
Business Groups By 1993 the structure of NZ Rail Ltd had narrowed into two market
groups and an operations group that ran the network as a cost
centre.  Individual business lines inside the Freight Group were
responsible for their direct costs and resulting financial contribution
to the overall group and transfer pricing as a measurement device
was scrapped.  Legally, NZ Rail Ltd. was unchanged, and until
1993 it remained as a crown owned company.   At the time of
privatisation in 1993 managerial accountability was organised as
follows:
New Zealand Rail Limited 1993  
Freight Groups
Rail Freight Group
Suburban
Long Distance
InterIslander
Rail Passenger Operations Corporate
Chief Executive
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CEO The NZ Rail Chief Executive was responsible to a Board of
Directors, appointed by the Government as shareholder.  With the
NZ Rail Ltd. structure there was much less direct political
involvement, however the rail business was still subject to intense
scrutiny by government agencies and could not function
independently, even as an SOE under the State Owned Enterprise
Act.
Private Owners Following the ownership change in 1993, the name NZ Rail Ltd
and this managerial accountability structure were retained by the
new owners until 1995 when a “re-branding” of the services
supplied by the business units was implemented to change the
company’s image.  At that time the name Tranz Rail NZ Ltd. was
adopted, followed by the IPO of Tranz Rail shares.  The basic
business units were retained for competitive reasons (see 4.2.2
below) and the Cook Strait ferry service was established as a stand-
alone business unit responsible for running that service.  Within
each business line, the service offerings were organised under the
following structure.  Each service is in effect a stand-alone
marketing unit accountable for its directly controllable financial
performance and with its own customers.  The operations group
continues to manage the rail network as a cost centre and rail ferry
operations are managed inside the InterIsland line.
TranzRail Limited 1995
CargoFlow
Distribution
Bulk Freight
Forestry
Kombi Freight
Tranz Link
Tranz Metro
InterIsland Travel
InterIsland Commercial Vehicle
Tranz Scenic
Passenger Operations InterIsland Line Corporate
CEO
Management Accountability and Culture
Incentives The impact of deregulation on rail from 1983 was significant in
terms of market and financial outcomes but deregulation also had a
major impact on how the business was managed.  It is fair to record
that management was seemingly unprepared for competition and
that it took them too long to seize control of their destiny.  In the
context of privatisation arguments and the lack of incentives on
public managers to set and achieve strategic goals, it is useful to
consider why it took so long for rail management to grasp the 1983
deregulation.
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The following table summarises the structural evolution of rail and
considers a number of factors that are useful when reviewing
managerial accountability.
Structural Evolution of Rail
G o v ern m en t D ep t N Z R a il  C o rp N Z R a il  L td T ra n zR a i l
D a tes p re 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 3  - 1 9 8 9 1 9 9 0  - 1 9 9 3 1 9 9 4  -
S tra teg y u n k n o w n react iv e p rep are fo r p riv at i sat io n sh areh o ld er v alu e
L eg a l  S ta tu s ? C ro w n  C o rp L im ited  l i ab i l i ty P riv ate C o m p an y
C o n tr o l  S t ru ctu re M in is ter i s  b o ss M in i s ter s t i l l  b o ss T reas u ry  w atch es M ark et s  m o n ito r
P o li t i ca l  In f lu en ce V ery  H ig h H ig h A rm s  l en g th L im ited
In ter n a l  S t ru ctu re F u n ct io n al B u s in ess  g ro u p s C o re B u s in ess  fo cu s M ark et in g  U n i ts
M a n a g em en t  F o cu s In tern al / tech n ical R es tru ctu rin g S u rv iv al C u s to m ers
P ro d u ct  M a rkets C o n tro l l ed  E n try D ereg u lat io n C o n tes tab le C o m p eti t iv e
D ecis io n  M a kin g C o n tro l l ed C o n t ro l l ed L im ited  d eleg at io n F u ll  d eleg at io n
Political Input In the period prior to NZ Rail Ltd. formation in 1990 there was a
great deal of political involvement in the rail business and
management did not have the incentives to get on and manage it in
a commercial way.  In noting the significant deterioration in the
financial outlook, the company in the 1986 business plan stated:
“The general reasons for this situation have their origins in the
former trading department, and since 1982, a Corporation, which
was nominally commercially orientated, being subjected to
Government policy totally at variance with this objective”.
These political constraints included both the delegation of financial
authority and the New Zealand Railway’s Corporation Act 1981.  In
a repetition of four attempts since 1880, the 1986 Strategic Plan
mooted a charter that formally set out relationships between the
Corporation and the Government.  Included was a proposal to
increase the financial delegation limits to the Corporation and a
review of the New Zealand Railway’s Corporation Act 1981, which
included staffing procedures. The Corporation felt that the system
of wage fixing to which it was subject was inappropriate when it
was acting as a profit making organisation rather than a government
service department, and that the system was hindering the
implementation of policies relating to procedural changes and staff
reductions.
It is clear from interviews conducted as part of this review that the
frustrations with the involvement of politicians in Rail Corp were
felt as much at Board level as with the management.  From 1988
several directors became quite active in promoting privatisation as a
way of distancing Rail from those pressures.
Managers It is interesting to reflect on the senior managers who led rail
through the period from 1988 to post privatisation and the
considerable number of new managers who were imported to Rail,
almost all of them after the sale to private owners.  Only Tranz Rail
CEO Francis Small, who was pivotal to the restructure and sale, and
Murray King, who was equally influential, remain as senior
managers in 1998.  A number of managers were bought into key
positions after the sale. Since privatisation several senior managers
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who were in Rail from 1988 have left while other managers such as
CFO Ron Russ have been brought in to manage specialist areas.
Markets and Competition
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7 Markets and Competition
Competition The existence of competitive pressure, in some form or other, on
rail is central to the analysis of effects of privatisation.  An active
and competitive product market is as important to the success of a
privatisation as is making the organisation transparent to the capital
and managerial markets.
Pre 1983 Prior to 1983 the market for moving freight was segmented by
regulation and Railways did not have to compete inside their long
distance market.  They did not bother about formal segmentation;
they just moved commodities for customers.  After deregulation
however Rail had to identify where its advantages lay and different
market pressures forced them to decide which segments to focus on,
and, as will be seen, they were forced to target their efforts to
survive.  Because of this critical fact, the targeted market segments
are identified and taken to the market analysis in stage 1 of this
review that is to be carried through to the stage 2 welfare analysis if
that stage proceeds. Stage 2 needs to be done at this level of detail
to identify the gains and losses from privatisation.
Segmentation A review of the freight market has identified that the market for
long haul freight movements, making up 70% of Tranz Rail
revenues, has 5 fundamental characteristics that identify 3
segments, as shown in the following table.  They are all long haul
markets but with different characteristics.
Tranz Rail’s tighter market focus in the 1990’s has seen them
manage in recognition of these segments.  Examples of this can be
seen in operational areas where;
1 it provides specialist trains by segment,
2 it established marketing units to manage the demands of
customers in each segment and
3 it improved data recording and analysis to understand and
respond to segment demands and performance.
 
 Quite clearly these segments are not rigidly structured but they have
evolved over time as Tranz Rail’s understanding of segment
characteristics has matured and as the market has evolved under
competition.  Also, as will be seen, the value and volume of
business in these segments have changed, as a result of changes to
technology, demand and relative prices.
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 Rail Freight Market Characteristics
 
 
Market Segment Timeliness Load
Size
Average
Haul
Handling
 Need
Handling
 Cost
B ulk G oods
 - coal
 - minerals less
important
larger loads  up to 300km seldom tiny
 - forestry
 - etc
Export G oods
 - import mixed - often at 1
 - export important containers & >300km end to customer very small
 - agriculture break bulk premises
Door-to-Door
 - wholesale often at both
 - retail critical smaller loads 500 to 800km ends to higher
 - refrigerated customer (inc door rail)
 - Kombi door
 
 Passengers The passenger business is easier to analyse, it naturally segments
itself into simple passenger movements: long distance by rail,
suburban by rail and InterIsland by Cook Strait ferries.  Both
market and welfare analysis will be completed on that basis.
Because of the nature of these markets there is little substitution
between them.
 
 Market  Evolution The time dimension is also important in this analysis and the
evolution of Rail over the period of this review falls naturally into 3
distinct stages, for the analysis of both the market and financial
performance.
 
 
Phase Market Outcome T ranzRail Outcome
Deregulation 83 to 88 long distance road transport
deregulated
m/share collapsed, unit
revenues fell
Rail survival 89 to 93 med growth, costs fell
overall, some segmentation
focus on understanding the
market & survival
Privatised 94 to 97 higher growth, segmentation focus on volume growth and
value by segment
 
 Deregulation affected market and financial outcomes in the period
to 1988 when Rail was in a financial crisis caused mostly by their
exposure to competition.  Political influence also played a part in
railway’s inability to deal with the competitive impacts.  In 1988
they did recognise their plight and determined the only way to
survival was to focus absolutely on the market segments that they
had advantage in and to restructure their finances and the
organisation in a way that enabled targeting customer requirements
in these segments.   Documented evidence from both business plans
and other papers show that the objective of privatisation was also
accepted by the company in that year.  Their objective was met in
1993 when NZ Rail Ltd. was sold and the privatised period 1994 to
1997 is obviously a phase in its own right.
 
 Coastal Shipping On a strict tonnage measurement basis, compared to rail and road, a
large amount of freight is moved by coastal shipping.  Coastal
shipping volumes have been stable between 12 and 14 million
tonnes per year since the early 1980’s as follows;
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tonnes 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Rail 8.9 8.6 8.3 8.7 8.5 9.4 9.6 10.3 11.5
Coastal
Shipping 13.6 14.5 13.3 13.8 14.3 14.3 13.2
 
 The tonnage carried on coastal ships could be seen as direct
competition to Rail particularly in the coal and other goods
categories.  While coastal shipping will offer price discipline for
rail, the nature of the freight moved by sea is quite specialised and
has a consistency in the mix of commodities moved over time.  It is
excluded from the market share calculations for Tranz Rail.
 
 
 Commodity Mix % - Coastal Shipping (tonnage)
  1984  1992
 Cement
 Coal
 Petroleum
 Sand/Shingle
 Grain
 Motor Vehicles
 Containers
 Other Goods
 10.8
 0.0
 57.5
 0.8
 0.3
 5.1
 4.1
 21.4
 7.4
 0.1
 64.1
 2.2
 0.0
 5.7
 3.6
 17.1
 
 Note that more recent data than 1992 is not available
 
 It is well known that even the threat of entry can discipline market
pricing [Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982)].  There are not
significant sunk costs to entry and exit of coastal shipping. It carries
more tonnage of long-haul outputs than does rail albeit that there is
some specialisation in product (see petroleum).  Thus, coastal
shipping will provide an important ceiling on pricing of rail freight
and may explain why the real price of all rail products have moved
downwards since the mid 1980’s.  In an actively contestable market
it could be expected that market share would be volatile over time.
The stability of coastal shipping’s products suggests that there are
intrinsic characteristics, such as location, that provide
differentiation between rail and shipping.  Nevertheless rail pricing
is constrained by the efficiency of coastal shipping.
 
 
 1983 to 1988 - Deregulation
 
 Pre 1983 Prior to deregulation in 1983, Rail had the market for transporting
freight over longer distance substantially to itself.  Market segment
analysis of the 1983 to 1988 period is a little more difficult than in
later periods due to the shortage of data and the undifferentiated
approach to the market that Rail had at that time.  Market share
estimates and overall output measure comparisons are the best
information that are available for analysis of this period.
 
 Market Share Market share was, and still is, difficult to measure in the freight
business, mostly because of the lack of a common unit of output
across the industry but also because of the lack of record keeping
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and the unwillingness to share information on the part of the
trucking industry.  The only data on trucking are surveys that are
carried out for specific purposes and do not easily permit
comparison over time.    Because detailed road transport data is not
available for this period, use is made of the Statistics New Zealand
Enterprise Survey, which reports industry revenue data rather than
output volume but is none-the-less an adequate indicator of relative
share.
 
 That data puts rail share of the total freight market at greater than
30% in 1980 and it portrays a short haul market dominated by road
transport that was, in revenue terms, about twice the size of the Rail
dominated long distance market.  By 1988, and still mostly in the
long haul business, rail had lost nearly a third of its freight business
in a very short time.  This is measured by share; the absolute
amount lost is clearly less.
 
 
 Using the cited Statistics New Zealand revenue data, analysis
reveals a decline in rail freight revenue (in constant $) versus an
increase in road revenues.  This simple comparison highlights the
dramatic real market share loss that rail experienced in the 1980’s.
 
 Outputs - Volume Overall freight market size (and share in later periods) have been
estimated using data on the tonne kilometers purchased from
NZLTSA as road user charges.  The data is adjusted for both truck
utilisation over time and the average tare weight of trucks to
calculate a net tonne kilometer that can be compared to rail NTK’s
(Number, Tonnes Kilometres). It is now accepted that the NZLTSA
data of road user charges understates the actual tonne-kilometers
travelled by trucks, with estimates of the understatement put as high
as 12% (this figure is from a study by the NZLTSA in 1997).
Although road user charges were implemented in 1984 detailed data
is only available from 1986 onwards.  It shows a sharp expansion in
market size took place in 1988 and that road transport share grew.
As shown below, rail’s share and tonnage fell throughout the
period.
 
 
1986 1987 1988
Market Size (m NTK) 10,700 10,800 11,800
Growth % - +1.3 +8.7
Rail Share % 28.5 26.9 24.8
Rail Growth % - -4.6 +0.4
 While rail freight volumes by market segment are not available
from that period, there was a real decline in both revenue per unit of
output and tonnes of freight carried indicating that the market
pressure may well have been felt across all of Rail’s market
segments.  During this period, PPI adjusted, cents/NTK declined by
more than 11% per year and tonnage fell by 4% pa.
 
 
 From 1983 to 1988 both the rail passenger and the SeaRail freight
and passenger businesses grew by an average 4% in volume.
Despite this real revenues fell, by an average 9% in rail passengers
and were largely unchanging for the Searail business.  Within these
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results, the number of commercial vehicles on the ferries doubled
over the period but in real terms revenues from that source declined
as price pressure was felt here as well as in the rail freight business.
This indicates that competition (sea and air) existed in this market
as well.
 
 
 Market Surveys Market survey material from that time shows just how sensitive the
market was to freight rates; with up to 75% of customers stating
that they would move to other transport modes if rail rates were
increased by up to 10%.  Interpretation of these figures would no
doubt be confounded by the incentives of the customers being
surveyed.  Despite this there was a strong perception conveyed by
the market surveys that road was a better mode of transport with
shorter transit times, better “service” (door to door etc) and a higher
standard of care for the goods being carried.
 
 
 Segmentation Despite the increased competitive pressure it was not until the latter
part of the 1983 - 1988 period that Rail Corp started to take a
segmented-marketing approach to freight customers, especially to
determine what influenced customer decisions to use road, rail or
sea for freight movements.  Rail’s targetting of customers via
marketing units in the freight lines of business and by their newly
formed corporate strategy unit was a significant step.  As will be
seen, it eventually led to the business units being both “commodity”
and customer focussed and recognised that a small number of base
customers dominated (and continue to do so to an even larger
extent) rail’s revenues.
 
 Price changes were implemented in a targeted way within some of
the segments where rail felt they were able to improve revenues but,
while short term revenue improvements occurred, the changes were
not sustainable and downwards pressure on volume and price
continued.
 
 The market segmentation analysis from here on is structured to
provide a review of changes to market characteristics (train size,
speed etc); that in turn gave rise to changes in market outcomes
(overall volumes, shares and price levels).  The market outcomes
generate in turn a strategic response from rail, which is then
reviewed along with rail’s own outcomes (revenues, etc).  The
segmentation structure is demonstrated in the following flow of
goods diagram.
 
 This framework is appropriate for describing how inputs and
outputs varied in both value and composition during the period but
is most useful in describing how the market characteristics
identified earlier come together as segments that can be measured
for size and scope. Unfortunately rail did not see its markets in this
way in 1983 and data are not available to describe the segments
until 1988.
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 Flow of Goods and Segmentation Structure
 
 
 
TranzRail  F low of
Goods
Inputs to the  Pr o c ess Tr anz Rail's C apability  and P ro c ess Custom er Se gments
Serv ices
Provided
B ul k  G o os
Labour
 - Netw ork  o perati n g
 - Termin als mo v e
freig h t - C ust omer  serv ice
 - Ma nagemen t
T he
E x p ort  Goods
mo v e
freig h tRai l
Network
Ca pit al G o o ds
 - Ferries Dis trib u tio n  s
 - Netw ork for han d le frei g ht
 - R oll in g  S t ock
 - I nfrastr u cture
Mov ing
Freig ht travel
experience
L o n g  Dista nce Passengers
an d
O perati n g  Resources
 - F ue l  (Diesel/p o wer) Passen gers rail j o urney
 - Main tenance S u b urban  Passe ngers
 - O perating
 - Marketi ng
 - Ma nagemen t
t ravel
In terIslan d  Passengers
C o o k  Stra it C ro ssi ng
In terIslan d  Tru c ks
 For confidentiality reasons this diagram cannot show the actual data on the
size and scope of each segment that has been used to compare and analyse
segment performance over time.
 
 Market Awareness It is however quite clear that the analytical work done in the
1983/88 period was the beginning of rail management’s
understanding of the sensitivities of the sources of freight market
share and financial performance.  The overall market and financial
information was assembled and analysed in an expanded corporate
strategy unit where an awareness was growing of just how fragile
the future of Rail Corporation was, given the way the market was
emerging and Rail’s deteriorating financial performance. (see
section 4.2.4).  Specific, market segment focussed processes were
developed in the newly formed business units where the detailed
business analysis was undertaken and the customer relationships
were managed.
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 Costs 1983 - 1988 It was not until 1986, when BAH conducted an in-depth analysis of
road transport economics, that rail had other than limited data
available on the costs of the road transport sector that they
competed with.  Deregulation and various tariff changes provided
for a continuous reduction to the real core costs of owning and
running a truck while the (increasingly) variable nature of the costs
of the truck business allowed firms to quickly adjust their cost
structures to changes in both market conditions and to technology.
Changes to the vehicle weight regulations, especially the increase in
gross vehicle weight to 44 tonnes, facilitated the development of
larger tonnage long haul trucks and trailers during this period.
 
 The following table highlights the variable nature of truck costs vs.
the high cost of wages that NZ rail suffered at that time.  Truck
operators, fuel, road user charges and drivers' wages were entirely
influenced by distance travelled.  Therefore truckers sought to make
as much of their costs variable to distance while rail was saddled
with more than half of their costs being fixed.
 
 Costs as % of Revenue
 
 Truck Costs  Rail Costs
 Costs  1984  1985  1987  1988
 Fuel  16.1  16.3  13.1  7.0
 Road User
Charges
 8.4  10.9  11.2  0
 Maintainence  15.7  15.0  14.1  8.0
 Wages  25.8  23.7  31.5  56.0
 Dep’n/Finance  13.0  10.4  15.6  8.0
 Other  18.0  20.8  12.6  21.0
 Total  97.00  97.10  98.10  100.00
 
 
 Interestingly, from the limited data available, it seems that trucks
did not suffer the same decline in revenue per unit of output during
1984 – 1988 and it was not until the late 1980’s early 1990’s that
the real rate for trucks started to fall; whereas the real cents per
NTK of output for rail did fall an average 6% pa during the 5 year
period to 1988.  Trucking was expanding both market size as well
as its share and, based on the perception of better service it seems
that customers were willing to pay a premium for road transport.  It
is also possible that the reductions in real freight rates were a
reflection of reduced costs brought about by cheaper imported
trucks.
 
 
 Quality of Service There is little evidence available to shed light as to whether or not
rail had any understanding of the factors that influence customers’
perceptions of their service quality.  Limited survey work was done
and this revealed that customers’ service concerns were limited to
price, knowing the location of their goods, and responsiveness.  The
issue of timing that was later revealed as important to all customers
and critical to some was not especially visible at that time.
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 1989 to 1993 - Rail Restructuring
 
 Two Factors In this period two factors directly affected both Rail Corp’s
competitive position and their performance.  One was the focussed
marketing effort that led to segmentation of the freight market and
which was substantially led by non-rail management people brought
in for that reason.  The other factor was the 1990 restructuring of
the “core” rail business into NZ Rail Ltd.  There is documented
evidence that, from early in 1989, the Board had decided on a
possible path to privatisation which would need market share
stability and a competitive position for rail if the business was to be
sustainable and the sale value maximised for the Government.
 
 Despite the market changes in the 1980’s that led to the growth in
other categories of revenue, freight still accounted for more than
60% of Rail’s revenue in 1989 and after the NZ Rail Ltd split in
1990, when property, buses and other non-core business revenues
stayed with the old Rail Corp, freight made up more than 70% of
NZ Rail revenue.  That is still the case 8 years later.
 
 
 Market Segmentation - Rail Freight
 
 Regulation By 1989 the direct regulation of road transport was all but complete
however a number of environmental factors did have an on-going
and significant impact on the freight movement business, more
especially on road transport.  Long distance road fees had been
removed in 1988.  Restructuring of truck, tyre and diesel tariffs had
resulted in a lower cost of ownership ... estimates show capital
prices were down 33%, diesel down 43% and operationally truck
utilisation was up 14% (source: BAH 1989 competitive analysis).
One of the direct results of this was the emergence of highly
efficient truck operators especially on the Wellington - Auckland
run.  Interestingly, Rail were advised by BAH that, given the last of
the structural changes, market equilibrium would be reached by
1991 and both market share losses and freight rates would stabilise
quite quickly at about the same time.  Quite clearly this did not turn
out to be the case.
 
 Tonnage Mix In a substantial portion of their market, Rail should have an
advantage over trucks, particularly where the need is to move large
loads of basic commodities over longer distances and handling is
minimal.   Its advantage of moving large loads over longer
distances with little handling in between is a characteristic of the
rail freight business and is captured in the market structure and
segmentation analysis described earlier.   That is what railways
have traditionally been meant to be good at.
 
 The mix of tonnage types is a good indicator of whether rail has a
strong focus on those segments where they have this advantage as
opposed to diversifying by moving other types of freight.  Analysis
shows that, over this period, their mix of goods moved is
increasingly dominated by bulk goods; coal, forestry goods and
minerals.   Overall their tonnage was stable at about 8.5m tonnes
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during the period, though the volume of both export and
distribution goods declined by more than 10%.
 
 
 Length of Haul Another indicator of change in the basic market structure is the
distance over which the goods are hauled.  Although it is partly a
function of the tonnage mix, it may also reflect the traditional
economic advantage rail has in being able to move larger loads over
longer distances that is highlighted in the segmentation.  The Bulk
Goods segment, made up of Bulk Freight and Forestry was stable at
a little under 300km per haul, the Cargo Flow export business fell a
little to about 300km and the Distribution business which is
substantially door to door freight increased haul distance to more
than 600km.  Quite clearly the movement of bulk goods from
source to sink is a different business than distribution where most
goods movements are between main centres and may involve a
Cook Strait crossing.
 
 
 Train Size & Speed Two factors useful in understanding the “load size” aspect of the
market as well as the productivity of rail are train size and speed.  If
rail is moving more bulk goods in a world of declining real unit
revenues it needs increasingly efficient ways of doing that to stay in
business.  Bigger, faster trains are one simple way of achieving this
and rail seems to have moved quite quickly to capture gains from
faster train speeds.
 
 Although net train size had been increasing slowly from
approximately 260 tonnes in 1980 it does not seem to have
contributed to a significant change to the shape of the freight
market in the 1989/93 period.  Of more importance is the steady
and significant increase that is seen with freight train speeds.
Stimulated by the growing market need for timeliness and
efficiency, Rail Corp. used a combination of technology changes
(changing 4 wheel wagons for bogie wheels) infrastructure
developments (welded rails and more passing bays), to push speeds
up and improve train utilisation.  (See section 4.2.3 for a detailed
analysis of investment in performance)
 
 
 Costs Incremental or directly avoidable costs by segment, split out by
train running, terminal and replacement capital costs will also have
an important influence on how rail is able to compete in various
segments.   Each segment requires rail to focus on different costs,
for example while it appears that train running costs were reduced
through operational efficiencies such as faster bigger trains, over
this period terminal costs (handling costs that are labour intensive)
also seemed to be reduced through both operational processes and
investment in lower cost facilities.  These improvements appear as
increased capital replacement costs, but should lower overall
incremental costs.  Overall Rail Corp. invested successfully in both
operational and capital improvements.
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 Train running and terminal costs both fell overall but investments
particularly in improved wagons led to an increase in the capital
cost element.
 
 Service Quality During this period Rail introduced the TQM approach to the
management of service quality.  The emphasis was on gaining
acceptance of TQM as a company wide philosophy and senior
managers were “trained” in the approach.  TQM fitted with their
marketing strategy of customer focussed management and
reinforced their awareness of service as an important factor in
customers’ decisions to use rail.  They collected a limited range of
specific quality measures designed to allow service performance to
be managed.
 
 Service quality measures for freight were quite limited, with data on
derailments, temporary speed restrictions and timeliness of priority
freight as the only quantitative evidence of attention to service
performance.
 
 A range of data on the timeliness of passenger service was collected
during this period though the data are not complete and therefore
are of limited use.
 
 
 
 Rail Corporation - Strategic Market Segmentation
 
 1988 Reorganisation As was seen in section 4.2.1, late in 1988 Rail Corp had been
internally reorganised into market specific business groups
(primarily Railfreight, Passenger and InterIsland) with the
substantial Railfreight group further segmented into market
segment business areas and a freight operations group that ran the
network.  This management structure allowed the freight group to
focus on both the commodities carried and customers served by
each segment.
 
 Marketing analysis conducted in 1989 showed that Tranz Rail's
share of the market was dominated by the transport of a very small
number of commodities for a small number of customers.  They
were squeezed between the power of their customers and the threat
of road and coastal shipping transport as substitutes in the areas
where they could be expected to look for improvements in market
share.  In 1989 it was estimated that 200 customers produced 90%
of their revenue (this concentration had narrowed to 47% from 10
customers in 1995), and it was this understanding that Rail Corp.
needed to be customer centric, seems to have brought their
marketing strategy into sharper focus from that time.
 
 Account Strategy It was in response to this knowledge that Rail Corp., late in 1989,
developed and implemented a targeted customer strategy.  Their
strategic approach here was more to reduce ongoing market risk and
improve both net revenues and volume growth, than to continue to
directly cut costs further.  This is a very important change in focus
because up to this time they had mostly concentrated on making the
company productive and cost efficient.
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 Their customer strategy had a number of complementary tactics.
These are described in what follows.
 
 Pricing Strategy In 1989 Tranz Rail also introduced a structured pricing strategy
using a two tiered approach to pricing whereby the competitive
environment sets the base price and “linkage” to NZR sets the
ability to charge a premium.  They saw targeted price increases as
valid revenue opportunities and increased prices twice in 1989; 5%
early in the year and a further 6.5% later on.  They clearly felt that,
assuming stability was around the corner, and that they needed to
take charge of their competitive future to meet their medium term
privatisation objectives.  These price changes were inappropriate
for the market conditions.
 
 Yield Management After the restructuring in 1990 that established NZ Rail Ltd., an
innovative revenue yield management programme was developed to
maximise revenues of containerised traffic.  This seems to be the
beginnings of rail’s targeted competitive approach and this
particular innovation has developed into their current Distribution
line of business that has been able to compete and grow and charge
a premium rate over straight container loads.   This service offering
has a set of characteristics, including part load handling, secure
transport and storage that provide distribution customers with a
quality that alternatives do not provide.
 
 
 
 Market Outcomes
 
 Market Size Overall the total freight market size did not grow significantly until
1992 when an estimated 9.5% annual growth was recorded,
signalling the end of the recession that New Zealand had
experienced for 4 years.   Again market size has been estimated
using data on road user charges, and shows the following market
dimensions for the period to 1993.  Of importance here is the strong
growth in the overall market NTK’s late in the period against
declining or small growth in Rail NTK’s.
 
 While the NTK estimation technique is not accurate enough to be
totally confident of the absolute value of the growth rates, the trend
of overall flat rail growth against a positive market growth
highlights rail’s relative decline in this period.
 
 
 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
Market Size (m NTK) 11,900 12,350 12,300 13,500 15,800
Growth % +1.7 +3.2 -0.1 +9.5 +17.1
Rail Share % 22.1 22.2 19.2 18.3 15.8
Rail Growth % -9.7 +3.9 -13.8 +4.7 +1.0
 
 Market Share Prior to 1990, two different estimation methods for market share
had been used by Rail to assess their market position. As before
37
they had used Statistics New Zealand’s AES data, which indicates
that rail’s share had stabilised at a low of 15% by 1990 when that
data series was assessed as unsuitable for estimating market share
and was no longer used.  To improve their estimates Rail
implemented a new approach in 1990 that used a model of inter-
regional freight movements.  Estimates from this method show a
1990 market share of 19% compared to 15% from the AES data,
and only small declines through to 1992 when the last of these new
estimates was completed.  Neither of these methods are comparable
over a long enough period of time to be that informative, nor do
they show what is felt to be the real trend, an ongoing decline in
rail’s share.
 
 ISCR Method The ISCR method of estimating market share that is described on
page 30, uses data to estimate market share, i.e.; an analysis of road
user statistics and truck utilisation data from RTA surveys, it is
believed that rail’s share of the NTK’s of the freight market has
declined steadily since the late 1980’s and is in fact much lower
than was previously thought.  The decline is particularly apparent
when viewing the strong growth in road NTK’s, up an average
8.7% pa 1989 through to 1993, while rail freight NTK’s declined by
3% pa in the same period.  While this is valuable trend information
it should be used with caution  for an analysis of levels.
Unfortunately the lack of a common unit of output and data
availability makes more certain market share estimates quite
difficult.
 
 From this and other data it seems that the nature of truck
competition did not change. Truck industry surveys indicate that the
real revenue per unit of output was stable for much of the period but
as already noted, capacity grew very strongly towards the end of
this period, as did utilisation of the truck fleet.  It seems that road
could offer a more attractive service, based on a competitive price
and therefore the market growth simply went to road and, quite
simply, rail’s overall market share fell as a result.
 
 Freight Volumes Rail’s own rail freight volumes, both tonnages and NTK’s were flat,
but this disguises some interesting changes within the individual
market segments Analysis of rail’s NTK’s (these capture both
distance and load) show that the bulk goods commodities, coal for
instance, increased a little while volumes of export goods fell by a
small amount.  In contrast to these changes, the output of
distribution goods fell through to 1991 after which a strong growth
in NTK’s can be seen.    The economy was not strong for most of
the period, it was in recession until June 1992 but started on a
strong growth cycle from late in 1992.  While any direct link
between rail’s performance and the New Zealand domestic
economy would be weak in the bulk and export transport segments,
the movement of distribution goods could well be affected by the
macro economy and this would therefore flow on to Rail’s freight
business.  This latter point is reinforced by the fact that during this
period truck capacity, represented by road user charges, changed
little but, as mentioned above, it grew strongly from 1992.  The link
between rail’s performance and international business cycles may
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not be weak in that certain bulk commodities are very susceptible to
the price and quantity change in international markets.
 
 
 Unit revenue Unit revenues (in cents per NTK) for each segment is a more
informative performance indicator than simple revenues.  Both the
bulk goods and export segments for instance had unchanging to
increasing volumes but declines in c/NTK which suggests that real
price reductions were necessary to maintain volume.  The only
segment to show growth in unit revenues of any magnitude was
distribution goods, which later became Tranz Rail’s Distribution
business.  Here rail managed to increase the real unit value of the
business with unchanging volumes.  Three factors contributed to
growth in this sector; firstly the service value to the customer
improved through rail including door-to-door capability, secondly
warehousing services were provided and thirdly a high value long
haul refrigeration capability was added during this period.  Also of
note within the distribution segment is the decline in output volume
and value of the freight forwarding business, remember that this is
the long haul component of the freight fowarding market that is
dominated by trucks.
 
 Passenger Market The involvement of New Zealand Rail in the business of moving
passengers in the period 1989 to 1993 changed dramatically.
Firstly, a substantial portion of Rail Corp’s Passenger Group
business was either left with Rail Corporation in 1990 as a result of
the NZ Rail Ltd. restructuring, or it was sold to private ownership
(e.g.: buses).  These decisions were implemented as a result of
various strategic reviews and of the deteriorating market position of
their rail passenger business.
 
 During the 1980’s the number of passengers that Rail Corp moved,
both long distance and short, had remained fairly stable.  Suburban
rail passengers peaked at nearly 16 million in 1986 while long
distance demand was stable between 800 and 900,000 pa.  By 1993
however, suburban passenger numbers had declined to just 10
million and long distance passenger numbers had more than halved
to less than 400,000.
 
 The increase in the number of second hand cars imported during
this period likely contributed to this decline, the following data on
used car imports shows a sharp increase that coincides with the
decline in rail passengers.
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 InterIslander Despite these rail passenger numbers, numbers on the InterIslander
increased by nearly 40% throughout 1988-93, to more than 900,000
in 1993.  This result was particularly notable as it was achieved
during a period of recession in the economy and after a period of
low growth in InterIslander demand during the mid to late 80’s.  In
tandem with the growth in passengers, Rail’s InterIsland
commercial vehicle traffic grew more than 30% in this period
alongside a growth in their own freight tonnage of less than 10%.
The growth in commercial freight volumes coincides with the
strong growth in road transport capacity, totalling 40% over the 5
years that occurred towards the end of the period 1988-93.   In real
terms ‘external’ revenues on the InterIslander were unchanging,
however as a result of the 1990 structural change, a change was
made to InterIslander performance reporting and it has not been
possible to recreate a Rail Corp to NZ Rail Ltd. comparison of
commercial and freight business.
 
 Prices for all InterIslander services fell in real terms, suggesting that
there has been some pressure from alternative modes of transport.
 
 
 
 1994 to 1997 - Post Privatisation
 
 This period was notable for 2 events; market share stopped falling
for the first time in 10 years and in real terms revenue grew, again
for the first time in 10 years.
 
 
 Market Segmentation - Rail Freight
 
 Regulation ended The deregulation of the freight business was well concluded by the
time NZ Rail Ltd. was sold in 1994.  Road User charges that had
been implemented in 1984, and had remained unchanged, were
revised in 1996 into a 2-tier price structure that was targeted at
being revenue neutral.  There were no impediments to competition.
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 Tonnage Mix The tonnage mix in this period reflects Tranz Rail’s strategy
targeted at both yield management and operational efficiencies
through economies of scale.  The mix is now increasingly
dominated by larger tonnages of bulk goods driven by growth in
that segment.
 
 Average Haul Average haul is stable, with both bulk and export goods averaging
about 300km.  The average haul of goods in the distribution area
showed a decline, in contrast to the small rise seen prior to
privatisation.
 
 Train Size & Speed Train size and speed are also interesting to compare with the
previous period.  Whereas train speed increased significantly
(+20%) in the period to 1993, it has not gone up much since then. It
is probably not possible to improve speed further without
significant investment.  Train size has continued the 1989/93 trend
and increased a little following privatisation, as Tranz Rail fine
tunes yield management aimed at improving net revenues from
market segments.  However, net train size has been reasonably
stable for the last 3 years.
 
 Costs Costs for train running continue to fall with significant reductions
apparent in the bulk and export goods segments.  Terminal and
capital replacement costs for distribution goods have increased as
market needs dictate.  Terminal costs for bulk goods have been
reduced significantly.
 
 Service Quality In 1996 Tranz Rail implemented a programme of measuring and
managing a range of operational indicators that have been identified
as important to service quality.  Time series data are not available
for the whole set of indicators, but the range of available measures
includes;
 
• Derailments
• Average time delay per train
• InterIslander delays - arrival and departures
• Wagon Utilisation
• Claims against Rail
Time series data are available for a continuation of the indicators
previously identified;
target ‘92 ‘93 ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97
Passenger Service Performance - Timekeeping
TranzScenic
% on time 70 52 53 52 39 41 56
% within 10 mins 95 75 73 69 60 72 80
InterIslander
Arrivals within 5 mins 68 100 61 70
Freight Service Performance
Mainline Derailments 62 48 63 78 53 71
Speed delay-mins 13870 12246 46542 20347
10100
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These data are variable and they are not informative of the
characteristics that matter directly to the customer.  For instance
they do not indicate the extent to which Tranz Rail’s specification
of being within +/- 15 minutes of the planned delivery time for
priority distribution freight is met.
Stability Overall it seems the period was one of stability compared to the
market upheaval of previous periods; with markets steadily getting
more competitive at the fringes.  It seems that Tranz Rail have
found their areas (market segments) of competitive advantage and
are managing them very efficiently.  The only issue is that of
longer-term sustainability as unit revenues decline and margins are
eroded as more of their costs become fixed.  Customers have
continued to place pressure on Rail for price/quality trade-offs and
the competition inside the distribution business and outside their
other nominated segments is quite intense.
Tranz Rail Strategic Approach
Focus
Overall the focus of the new owners has been on yield management;
that is, optimising the price/volume mix in the market place as well
as implementing refinements in the operations of the railway to
improve productivity and customer service.
Its 1995 prospectus states that its perception that it is moving from
being a key provider of low cost line haul to a provider of
integrated transport services.  Its well-defined marketing strategy
has been targeted at keeping the freight revenues growing by
managing the price element of the marketing mix and lifting the
level of service it offers to its customers.  It sees long term growth
in the freighting of bulk commodities such as coal and forestry and,
in the immediate future, in the distribution of goods that have
traditionally been handled by trucks.  It sees its competitive
advantages in this segment as its ability to move larger volumes
over longer distances in conjunction with efficient door-to-door
service that distribution customers require.  Tranz Rail has invested
in trucking capability to meet these requirements and since 1992
has (part and then fully) owned its own refrigerated truck business
for that specialised segment.  By the date of privatisation most of
the heavy investment restructuring had been completed, and Tranz
Rail has concentrated on fine tuning their service operations since
then.
Freight Customers The specialised marketing tactics that are needed to compete in
each segment have resulted in Tranz Rail preserving and tightening
its focus on the same market segmentation as existed before this
period.  It has further developed the business units especially for
this purpose.  Obviously, BulkFlow customers, for example: Coal
Corp, require a different approach than customers of the
Distribution business.  The marketing tactics employed so far
appear to have been very successful, especially in expanding
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volumes of bulk commodities, but also in continuing the important
revenue growth trend that developed from their Distribution
segment.
Passengers Passenger segments are a little different.  Commuter services in
Auckland and Wellington are undertaken with subsidy payments
from the local bodies in those areas, while marketing of long
distance services are route based and are targeted at tourists.   The
long distance business is not subsidised and is marketed on the
basis of the travel experience it provides.  Some passenger services
are still viewed by Tranz Rail as marginal business. To survive they
are required to contribute to the fixed costs of running the network.
Presumably, this applies to all market segments.
InterIslander The InterIsland ferries provide both an essential part of the rail
network connecting the North and South Island as well as separate
services to commercial freight customers and to passengers.  Tranz
Rail has faced various competitors to their InterIsland service,
however those that have managed to survive more than a short time
have proved to have an insignificant impact on market share.  It is
noteworthy that real prices of InterIsland services have continued to
decline.
Market Outcomes
Market Size The freight market grew significantly in the period following
privatisation. Much of the expansion was due to the increase in
aggregate real economic growth of 6.2%, 5.3% and 3.1% in 1994,
‘95 and ‘96 respectively.  As before, market size (road and rail
NTK’s only) has been estimated using data on road user charges,
and shows the following market dimensions for the period to 1997;
1994 1995 1996 1997
Market Size (m
NTK)
20,7000 22,200 23,500 24,500
Growth % +31.1 +7.3 +5.6 +4.5
Rail Share % 13.7 14.4 13.9 14.3
Rail Growth % +13.4 +12.9 +1.8 +7.5
Growth in overall market size has slowed from the high levels that
occurred just prior to privatisation, but importantly rail have
managed to maintain their share and in fact expanded their NTK’s
at a higher than market rate for 2 of the 4 years since privatisation.
Market Share Market share estimates, using the ISCR approach described earlier,
indicate a significant change in the trend of falling share that rail
had experienced for 9 years.  While the ISCR approach is clearly
not accurate enough for other uses, it is, as previously discussed, an
adequate indicator of broad trends.  Market share analysis shows
that the market share loss observed in other estimation approaches
for the period 1989 to 1993 is replicated using this method, and
43
that, from 1994 to 1997, the decline slowed considerably, despite
the strong growth in trucking’s share of the NTK’s that started in
1992.  This indicates success in rail’s product marketing tactics as
well as for the growth in output volumes of commodities in rail’s
core market segments.
Output Volumes Tranz Rail continued to transform its Fowarding business (as in the
pre-privatisation period) to Distribution where it was of greater
value to its customers. This change was at some cost to rail, as
volumes went up, real unit revenues fell.  Their major lines of Bulk
Goods suffered the largest price declines, falling an average 7% pa
over the 1994 to 97 period but had volume growth of 5.5% pa as a
result.  Other than the price and small volume growth in the
Distribution segment, the most significant changes took place in the
Export goods segment where price fell by 4.4% but volume growth
was nearly 12% on average.  These results all indicate how price
sensitive Tranz Rail's market segments are.
Overall Overall, the long term decline that rail had experienced in both
freight volumes and market share ceased and from 1994 sustainable
growth was recorded.  By comparison, capacity in the road
transport business (data sourced from road user charges) grew
strongly to 1994 but growth has slowed from that time.  The
analysis also recorded a trend to smaller capacity trucks with road
user km’s purchased showing a decline in all weight categories
above 5 tonnes. This possibly resulted from Tranz Rail’s success in
the long haul of bulk goods.
Unit Revenues Until 1994 the long term trend in real output prices had been in
sympathy with the decline in output volumes, they both fell, but
unlike the growth in volume since then, unit revenues have
continued to fall albeit at a slower rate.
Within this overall downward trend in prices, output value in
cents/NTK fell significantly in both the Bulk and Export segments
over the post privatisation period and, as noted, increased in the
Distribution segment, continuing the trend of the pre-privatisation
period.  Clearly customers are placing an increasing value on rail’s
capability in this area.  The emphasis has continued to be on
enhancing the mix of factors that make up their distribution
offering, timeliness, storage and handling especially.
Passenger Market
Tranz Rail Strategic
View Some passenger services are marginal and if passengers cannot pay
their avoidable costs and make a contribution to common costs then
they will not continue with that particular passenger service.  The
same argument applies to other activities, including passengers on
the Cook Strait ferries.  In this case Tranz Rail maintain that freight
and commercial vehicles would still provide them with a viable
business to fund the ferries that did not carry passengers, although
there are some economies of scope.  Passenger services are all
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viewed as standalone businesses and are managed and marketed as
such.
TranzScenic Marketing rails’ long distance passengers services was
implemented via the 1995 rebranding of long distance services
which created a number of individual “named” long distance
journeys targeted at tourists who seek a particular train trip
experience.   In the same fashion as freight the strategy here was to
maximise yield by getting the price/service mix right, adjusting
prices upwards whenever possible.  Price increases were
implemented in 1995 and twice in 1996. Passenger numbers
increased in both 1996 and 1997 after a small decline in 1994.
As a result of this strategy both revenues and passenger numbers
have grown strongly since privatisation.  This indicates that Tranz
Rail have targeted “experience” travel, because real airfares and
costs of car transport between main centres have declined over the
period.
TranzMetro In line with this strategy, from 1990 suburban passenger journeys,
branded as TranzMetro, are confined to Auckland and Wellington
and as long as contracts and financial support from the local
regional councils are available, rail will continue to provide the
service.  Passenger journeys are increasing again but are not
anywhere near the levels of the early 1980’s, with the market
growth limited by the strong competition from the transport of
people by road.
InterIslander Compared to rail passenger performance, InterIslander passenger
business is a real success story.  Passenger numbers increased from
966,000 in 1994 to 1,085,000 in 1997 while revenues show
particularly strong growth from 1995.  In the summer of 1994/95
Tranz Rail introduced a fast ferry service across Cook Strait to cater
for passengers that want a shorter travel time and who are prepared
to pay a price premium for it.  For part of that summer season and
the following summer two operators competed with Tranz Rail in
the fast ferry portion of the InterIsland business but both failed to
survive.  Competition for passenger non-vehicle transport exists
from Plimmerton.
The aging of the existing conventional ferries and the on-going
success of the InterIslander service has encouraged them to invest
in a new roll-on roll-off ferry and to seriously consider keeping the
fast ferry on for future summer seasons.  The fast ferry service
breaks even as a standalone business and is therefore of value to
Tranz Rail.  Analysis of the fast ferry financial performance has
revealed that Tranz Rail do not cross subsidise this service.
The price of standard commercial vehicle and passenger transport
on Cook Strait services declined in real terms over the period 1987 -
1997, some by as much as 3% per annum.  The introduction of a
new product - the fast ferry - resulted in measured non-quality-
adjusted increase.  However, this did not eliminate the decline in
real prices over all.
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Overall: the Market
In Summary Competition in the product markets was pivotal to the fortunes of
Rail Corp. through the 1980’s as they struggled to get to grips with
what competition meant to a railway.  Unfortunately it took too
long to work those issues out and when in 1990 rail did eventually
devise a marketing strategy to establish and maintain its market
position it was in a very weak structural and financial state.
This aspect of the analysis is picked up later where the financial
consequences of the market evolution are reviewed, and the
financial and organisational restructure is described.
From this analysis a number of issues emerge;
The market The market for long haul freight went through a long adjustment
stage that resulted in rail emphasising its competitive advantage in
the movement of bulk goods over long distances.  Structurally the
overall market seems to have changed little but its value increased
20% in real terms over the 1986 - 97 period.  While the market has
grown Tranz Rail’s share on the other hand has fallen by nearly
40%, with much of the loss occurring in the period prior to 1990.
Market volumes have more than doubled in the period 1986-97 as
prices fell.
Marketing Strategy Once rail had adjusted to the turmoil of the 1980’s it devised a
marketing strategy that, combined with good operational
management and targeted investments, has allowed them to stem
the market losses and actually grow the business.  This was
implemented not coincidentally, at the time that privatisation
decisions had been reached.  This will be discussed subsequently.
Service Quality It seems that more attention could be paid to the assessment of
service quality, particularly that which relates directly to customers.
The random results of the limited range of indicators are not sharply
focussed on customers.  It was not until 1996 that management
sought systematic evidence of both these and other indicators.
Passengers The rail passenger business shrank as a consequence of withdrawal
of central government subsidies, and lower car costs, partly
resulting from the importation of used cars.  Again it was not until a
strategic approach was taken to managing the business that it
showed any signs of being successful.  Contracts with local
councils in Auckland and Wellington, to support local passenger
services, have been key to successful provision of these services. A
particular marketing strategy was applied to long distance services
to make them successful.  Both services make a positive financial
contribution to Rail’s fixed costs.
InterIslander The movement of passengers and freight across Cook Strait has
been financially successful.  Innovations, such as the fast ferry have
survived entrants to the passenger business and despite small
competitors moving freight, Rail have been very successful in
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expanding all aspects of that business.  Real prices for these
services have declined and hence potential and actual competition
seem to be constraining prices in this market segment
Market deregulation and the competitive evolution was a major
contribution to the changes observed.
Labour and Technology
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8 Labour and Technology
Key Elements The importance of labour and technology to the success of the rail
business should not be underestimated. Labour productivity and
asset efficiency determine rail’s cost structure which is the basis of
success in a competitive market.  To be a successful carrier of long
haul - bulk commodities simply requires being the cheapest
because customers are primarily seeking low cost service.  As
observed in the review of rail’s marketing effort it is possible to
gain incremental value from doing something differently (their
distribution business brought together a mix of service features
that have led to expansion in the size and value of that segment),
but at this time rail do not have a core advantage in distribution
and logistics, it does in bulk haul commodities over longer
distances.
Redundancies After deregulation in 1983 and before March 1985 rail reduced
staff numbers only by voluntary means, in accordance with a
political directive.
The financial situation of the company in 1986 necessitated more
rapid productivity gains.  The recovery plan outlined in the
Strategic Plan of that year concentrated on reducing staff more
quickly by closing facilities such as workshops and warehouses as
well as introducing more effective work processes and methods.
Before 1986 Rail management and the owners had employed a
strategy of allowing staff to take voluntary severance but when
that did not provide a fast enough reduction in costs, a more
forceful approach was taken.  The introduction of new technology
was critical in allowing this to happen and a series of projects
were introduced to increase productivity.  The investment
initiatives are reviewed in the next section.
Seagoing Reducing the costs of seagoing personnel appears to have taken
longer than similar initiatives in other areas of the business.  In the
early stage of rail’s restructuring, the employment conditions for
its InterIsland operation’s (Searail) seagoing staff were complex:
they were contained in four service organisations and five
industrial documents.  Two other documents, to which Searail was
not a party, also had a bearing on these principal documents.  In
this environment, the industrial relations function of Searail was
seen as key.  In reviewing the functions, structure and numbers of
staff in 1987, Searail was keen to “adopt a pro-active positive,
modern and imaginative approach to industrial staff/relations to
create a solid, loyal, co-operative team …”
By 1989, however, it was noted that there was low morale among
large sectors of the staff as a result of restructuring, even though
the relationship with the Maritime Union was reported to be
“stable” and there were low levels of industrial dispute within all
parts of the Company.  Two years later, negotiations with the
Maritime Union to reduce crew numbers and eliminate restrictive
practices and expensive conditions of employment (for example,
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leave ratios, extra sailing payments, and shore-based
accommodation) were again reported.  While the process was
expected to be lengthy, the unions were “willing to concede on
costly and inequitable conditions of employment”.
But high personnel costs and rigid operating regimes contained in
the maritime collective agreement in 1994 were stated to be the
most important issue for interisland operations at this time.
Negotiations concluded in mid-1994 were expected to reduce
personnel expenditure by 28%.  This was on top of substantial cost
reductions which had been achieved through shore-based
restructuring in early 1993/94.
    Work practices and methods
Innovations A series of technological innovations, along with industrial
agreement to implement them, allowed the introduction of more
efficient work practices.  For example, radio technology has had a
significant impact on the company and the way in which it
operates its rail network in the following areas:
• Alternative train crewing:  In 1988 an industrial agreement
had been reached to implement single person crewing on rail
and by 1991 it was substantially complete.  This was
achieved with the assistance of computer-aided radio
communication which allowed communications between
train control and the locomotive engineer.  It was then no
longer necessary to have a second crew member on board for
safety reasons.
 
• Track Warrant Control: Track Warrant Control uses radio
technology to provide a simple method of track clearance for
trains.  Centralised traffic control had been used on heavily
used routes, but simpler forms of signalling and control had
been retained on less used provincial lines.  These latter
forms of signalling were labour intensive and expensive to
operate and maintain.  In some instances required staff based
at regular intervals along the route and around the clock.
 
• Shunting:  Shunting had traditionally been controlled using
hand signals during the day and hand lamps at night.  In
addition to the restrictive visibility requirement, this system
was hampered by the numbers in the work teams involved.
Radio communications has allowed considerably fewer
people and lower costs. Recently the Corporation has been
investigating the use of remote controlled locomotives for
shunting.
 
 Fewer Staff Restructuring within the organisation and rationalising operations
also led to changes in work methods and a reduced need for staff.
For example, when the Corporation was restructured into three
business groups in 1987, they were to provide their own support
services, reducing the Corporate group from 800 to 60.  There
50
were also staff reductions in workshops due to the lighter
maintenance workload as a result of a smaller wagon fleet (see the
section below); re-organisation and reduction in track and work-
gang strengths; the closure of District Offices and rationalisation
of Area Construction Managers’ offices; and freight terminal
consolidation. Multi-skilling has been a more recent introduction
under a company and trade union agreement to bring increasing
flexibility in work methods.  It was introduced into freight yards
by 1991 and has since been extended into workshops and depots
as well.
 
 Contracting Out The contracting-out of services has been another method the
corporation has used to reduce fixed costs and establish a greater
dependence of operating costs on volume.  It began early in the
restructuring process (before 1988 this was mainly in the area of
building and bridge construction), at which time there was some
resistance from unions.  In addition to increasing the volume
variability of costs, there were other benefits seen to be gained
from contracting out services:
 
• quality assurance standards, including benchmarking
opportunities
• penalty payments for non-performance
• the creation of a competitive supply situation.
In 1991, the Boston Consulting Group estimated that the
Corporation could save approximately $20-30 million annually by
contracting out those services that were not strategically important
to control in-house, for example yard operations, freight services
and crewing.
Improving work practices by using technology has remained an
on-going focus for the company in seeking productivity gains.
Recently the company has invested in Ontrac for freight
management using barcode technology.  The system tracks freight
items themselves, rather than tracking associated documentation.
An extension of the system, Ontrac Direct allows customers to
track the process of their freight in close to real time using the
Internet.  The system produces electronic versions of waybills and
consignment notes.
    Rationalisation of wagon fleet
Objectives Changes in the wagon fleet and the basic hardware of the freight
business, have been substantial and on-going.  The key principles
have been to:
• replace the traditional four wheel wagons with the faster,
more efficient eight-wheel bogie wagons,
• improve the load-to-tare ratio,
• allow more payload per tonne of wagon,
• develop wagon types that are more suited to meeting the
needs of customers.
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The aim had been to enable the Corporation to compete more
effectively with road carriers in terms of both cost efficiency and
customer service.
In 1988 the Corporation began the introduction of new high
volume aluminium bulk wagons which were used principally for
coal haulage, but which also opened up market segments in other
bulk products where rail had been previously uncompetitive.  Only
42 of the new wagons were required to replace approximately 600
of the old ones, resulting in lower maintenance and operating
expenses. The following year the Corporation began plans to
introduce the Roadrailer, a wagon used for freight distribution
which can transfer from road to rail, eliminating double-handling.
SwapBodies The development of new wagon types continued, and by 1991, the
wagon fleet consisted of several types of wagons which could be
configured to meet the specific needs of individual customers.
These included the wagons mentioned above, Swap Bodies (where
a larger container-type unit can be placed on top of a flat-bed
wagon), canopy wagons designed for ease of loading and
unloading, car-carrying wagons, wagons with extended cradles for
carrying forest products, and a growing variety of containers such
as curtain sided containers and containers with extra height and
weather protection for coal.  These all added to the service
capability provided and represent an aspect of service quality that
customers were prepared to pay a premium for.
The dramatic change in the make-up of the wagon fleet has
improved asset utilisation as well as quality.  It has reduced costs
and placed the company in a better position to meet customer
needs.
    Investment  in infrastructure
Some of the innovations in wagon development have allowed the
company to take advantage of track improvements which enable
heavier axle loads, improved clearances and the faster train speeds
noted earlier.  Investment in an on-going programme of welded
joint elimination that created continuous lines throughout the
network.  It enhanced the utility of the North Island Main Trunk
Line electrification that had been completed by 1989.
    Information technology
The Information Services division of Railfreight Systems detailed
an extensive review of the business systems requirements for the
organisation in its 1988-1990 Business Plan.  The emphasis was
on an integrated approach to planning and clarifying priorities for
the Group overall with the ultimate aim of enhancing the ability of
the company to work effectively as a single business entity.  A
range of requirements was identified for each group within
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Railfreight, but a common focus was a perceived need for
improved decision support and productivity gains.
The rationales for the introduction of systems in each area were as
follows.
Management Improved managerial effectiveness with reduced clerical support.   
Managers were provided with computer terminals to allow access to
data and decision making tools.
Customer
interface
Productivity and service quality.  The plan noted that “information
technology is hardly used in the customer interface activities of the
group at present [1988]; and yet it is in this area of the business that
the strategic use of information technology holds out the greatest
opportunity to make big gains in productivity, service quality and
competitive advantage.”
Operations Optimisation of the process under which train timetables and crew
and locomotive rosters are developed from workload projections.   
This crucial process determines the fixed labour and capital resources
of the rail transport operation and largely determines the cost levels
of the Group’s rail operations.
Engineering Increased decision support through accurate databases with simple
data retrieval.
Searail Increased productivity and customer satisfaction via passenger and
motor vehicle reservation system.
Accounting Ensuring that the costs consequences of managers’ decisions were
clear to them.  Reduction of the clerical cost of the accounting system.
Human
resources
Improved productivity in clerical and administrative procedures for
the payroll system. Also, computerised training for large scale
retraining in new skills (especially business skills and new business
A series of projects was implemented in a sequence which allowed
the benefits from less complex projects to be gained quickly.  The
first was the Marketing Information System (accounting,
marketing and asset database) and systems for transit control and
yard and train operations followed.
AMICUS In 1990 a computerised ticket system was introduced and the first
stage of a major project AMICUS was completed.  This project,
implemented in two parts, has provided an integrated marketing
and operations system.    AMICUS 1 is a computerised record,
pricing and invoicing system for freight.  It is designed to reduce
costs and increase customer service.  It provides sales planning,
equipment ordering, automated waybilling and a variety of
market-related activities.
The following year saw the beginning of development work for
AMICUS 2 which was operational by December 1992.  It
automated recording of train and wagon movements, assisted with
planning for train and ferry services, and permitted immediate
wagon location, ordering and distribution.  As a part of the system,
automatic vehicle identification was introduced which identifies
locomotives, wagons and containers as they pass checkpoints by
reading identification tags.  Wheel sensors provide information on
train direction, speed and the specific wagons being carried and
some also record the weight of each wagon.
The corporation sees its ability to quickly unite information
technology and the physical elements of the business as the means
to gaining a competitive advantage.  A recent example is the 24-
hour customer service centre which is being integrated with a new
equipment management centre and the network control centre.
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The aim is to ensure that equipment availability and systems
management are integrated with customer needs.
    Results of these Initiatives
Staff numbers The staff reduction programmes resulted in a dramatic decrease in
numbers between 1983 and 1991, with numbers since levelling
off.
Staff numbers
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As discussed in the previous section, the company hoped to reduce
staff by means of attrition after corporatisation in 1983, but its
severe financial position by 1986 forced it to do this by means of
involuntary redundancies.  In the longer term this saved a
substantial level of cost, but one-off redundancy payments were a
major cost to the organisation.  In 1997-dollar terms, the company
made a total of $438million in staff severance payments between
1987 and 1993.  It announced a further redundancy plan in the
1997 Annual Report with a provision of $12 million over the next
three years.
Redundancy Expenses
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
$m
Spent
40.8 56.8 90.4 47.9 48.4 39.3 13.9
Along with a reduction in overall staff numbers there has been
more subtle changes in the composition of the workforce in rail.
In 1983 46% of the workforce was employed in engineering and
track operations and 38% in freight handling.  Only a very small
number of the freight staff were customer interfacing in marketing
or sales roles.  By 1990 organisational changes resulting from
market conditions and internal performance requirements saw
changes.  Only 32% of the staff were in either engineering or
operations while these in freight totalled 36% of the total.  In 1990
7% of total staff were involved in freight marketing.   At the time
of privatisation that number had risen to 9% and in 1997 it was
13%.  Since 1991 the number of staff involved in engineering or
operational work has remained at about 40%.
Cost Structure As well as reducing the absolute level of personnel costs, a
principal goal of the reduction of staff numbers has been to
increase the volume sensitivity of operating costs.  A discussed
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earlier this was a critical element in increasing competitiveness
relative to road carriers.  As a result of the lower staff levels, staff
costs (excluding severance costs) as a ratio of total operating costs
has decreased from 60% in 1983, to 42% in 1997.
Total operating e xpenses
and personnel e xpenses
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       Capital expenditure
Capex The reduction in staff levels and improved work processes were
possible only with the increased use of new technology and
information systems.  Investment over the period 1983 to 1997 is
shown below.  The graph shows that capital expenditure over the
last 10 years was heaviest prior to, and during, the period of staff
layoffs.  It should be noted, however, that changes in accounting
treatment of investment relating to capitalised expenses mean that
the comparison of these numbers over time should be undertaken
with caution.
Capital expenditure 1983-1987
(1997 dollars)
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9 Financial Performance
Approach The analysis of financial performance follows the steps of the
market approach, it has 3 distinct phases, the market outcomes
directly affected the financial performance, and formal performance
reviews led to strategic decisions to improve performance.   In each
period (83 to 88, 89 to 93 and 94 to 97) the financial analysis review
considers;
• the financial consequences of market outcomes
• objectives from performance reviews
• actual operating performance that resulted
 
 
 1983 to 1988 - Deregulation
 
 Performance Reviews  In the 10 years prior to privatisation the performance of railways in
all its structural forms was the subject of constant performance
review, especially by US consultants Booz Allen & Hamilton.  In
the face of deregulation of the trucking industry in 1983, Rail
Corporation Directors brought Booz Allen in to undertake a review
of operations and strategic options for the future of rail in NZ.
Their concern was whether rail had a sustainable business with a
deregulated road transport sector.  The 1983 review was very
significant because it identified the key factors that rail needed to
deal with if it was to be competitive over the longer run and set the
organisation down a commercial path that became more tightly
focused as time went by.
 
 Rail needed to:
• lower its freight cost structure to match that of road transport
• accept that it could lose up to 25% market share
• generate productivity improvements
• close some of the workshops
• review ferry operations
• organise on a more commercial basis
Rail’s continued participation in the market place was the subject of
a series of strategic options, with both passenger and freight
reviewed in some detail.  BAH recommendations were implemented
almost to the letter and over the 5 year period to 1988 much of what
BAH had forecast did indeed come to pass for that period. Rail’s
costs, especially for freight, were restructured with a very heavy
emphasis on investing to upgrade assets and productivity
improvements from process upgrades and limited staff reductions.
Freight was defined as the core business, with passenger services
viewed as incremental to the core.
Market Share losses The financial consequences of the market share losses and the price
reductions that rail experiences were severe with freight revenues
dropping 37% in the period, substantially resulting from the real
price reductions discussed in section 4.2.2.  Special note should be
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made of the influence of property revenues and the level of the
subsidies received from government (see the following table).  Two
other important points to make relate to the sale of the road bus
business leading to the discontinuation of that revenue. The constant
restructuring makes the comparison of different revenue
classifications hazardous over this period.  The road service
business had been part of rail operations for a number of years.  But
because this review is of the core rail business that was privatised,
the bus business is not analysed in detail in this report.
OPERAT ING PERFORMANCE – CONSTANT  $000
31 -Ma r
1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
OPE RATIN G R E VEN UES
(000's)N Z R ail Freight 640, 654 556, 328 516, 162 475, 912 445, 515 422, 07
Rail Pass engers 116, 457 113, 615 68 ,678 82 ,420 71 ,531
Passenge r  Group 139, 33
Ro ad 67 ,721 70 ,215 68 ,584 74 ,718 81 ,762
Se a 95 ,914 87 ,331 87 ,097
Se aRail 85 ,334 98 ,169 63659
Othe r 16 ,293 23 ,450 13 ,683 18 ,108 15 ,110 4, 93
Prop erty 6, 560 16 ,994 22 ,490 64216
Subsidy  (inc in  rail/passeng ers) 134, 907 116, 172 89 ,907 99 ,634 92 ,081 52973
TOTAL O PER ATIN G  REVEN UES  937,038  850,940  760,764  753,488  734,576 693, 08
OPE RATIN G C OSTS
Pe rsonnel Costs 709, 413 604, 229 570, 075 605, 273 599, 317 584, 65
D epr e ciation 48 ,931 63 ,299 63 ,602 65 ,662 67 ,150 69620
M aterials Se r vice s etc 282, 426 197, 168 197, 057 198, 988 152, 198 260, 79
Othe r  Costs 110, 886 99 ,493 89 ,074 107, 868 124, 378
TOTAL O PER ATIN G  COSTS 1, 151,656 964, 188 919, 809 977, 790 943, 043 913, 64
EA R NIN GS FROM OPE R ATIO NS (214,619) (113,248) (159,045) (224,303) (208,466) (220,156)
Costs In absolute terms rail’s cost levels did decline with the most
significant drop taking place in 1984.  For the remainder of the
period costs were unchanging in real terms. During 1983-1988 it
appears that rail did not make adequate headway in gaining real cost
reductions and, by using basic cost estimations in the absence of
economic cost models, their freight business is estimated to have
been at a cost disadvantage relative to trucks.  BAH estimated that
long haul trucks costs were about the same level as rail in 1986.
Balance Sheet In addition to their deteriorating operating performance, by 1988
rail was also facing a crisis on its balance sheet brought about by the
big investment projects that were described in section 4.2.3.  As one
element of the essential productivity improvements BAH, in 1983,
recommended an investment programme to update rail’s older
rolling stock and infrastructure assets.  These programmes were in
addition to the major main trunk electrification project that the
government imposed.  In the ‘83 to ‘88 period rail spent $914m
(constant 1997$) on capital projects.  The difficulty with their
investment programme was that rail simply had an inadequate cash
flow to fund the investment and, in addition to the capital plan, they
needed to borrow to fund their operating losses.  This need was not
unexpected, BAH had predicted the requirement to borrow to fund
the capital programme, however extremely high local interest rates
helped to expand the costs of rail’s debt.  By 1988 rail had $1billion
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of debt compared with $200m in 1983. Shareholder's funds were
nearly halved in the period.  As will be seen the financial crisis
came to a head in 1989 when $1billion of debt had to be written off
rail’s books.  It was taken over by the government.
1986 Optimism BAH were brought back in 1986 to review progress on
implementation of their 1983 report.  Rail Corp management was
deeply concerned about the rate of market share loss and the
collapse in financial performance.   Advisors to rail management
were optimistic that the measures that were being taken would
reverse the trend of steeply declining revenues and poor labour
productivity especially given the decision to restructure to achieve a
tighter focus on markets.  This restructuring involved adjusting the
freight business to bring the major commodity groups (paper, logs,
coal etc) into management focus and allow both market and cost
issues to be managed together. Financial performance through to
1988 did not show any improvement beyond a small reduction in
costs.
It is not possible to review incremental costs and the activities
where Rail generated contributions to fixed cost over this period.
Rail did not have cost models to assess the avoidable costs of each
business area.
1989 to 1993 - Financial Restructuring
Overall This period was of major importance when looking at the financial
performance of Rail in this period as well as post privatisation.
Significant organisational, financial and resource restructuring took
place as a result of the poor financial performance in the 1983 to
1988 period.  Looking at overall organisational performance during
this period, 4 particular aspects stand out.
1. The steep revenue decline that had existed from 1983 to 1988
persisted,
2. In 1989 approx $1.0 billion of debt was written off the balance
sheet of NZ Rail Corporation.
3. NZ Rail Ltd, a “Rail” only business was established in 1990.
4. NZ Rail Ltd was sold to private interests in September 1993.
More Optimism In the continued absence of suitable internal resources, BAH were
still used as rail’s performance advisors and in July 1989 they
reported on the long term viability of a stand alone rail business.
Management were advised that rail’s poor financial performance in
the period to 1988 would become stable by 1991, based on the
belief that the major changes in the road transport market place
were complete and that freight rates for road transport would not
drop further.  As noted earlier, long distance road fees had been
removed in 1988 and the restructuring of truck, tyre and diesel
tariffs had resulted in a lower cost of ownership and therefore lower
rates for freighting goods by road.  As discussed in section 4.2.2 rail
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increased price in both the freight and passenger rail markets in
1989.
Actual results On a normalised basis (1989 results were for 15 months.  1991 was
for 4 months as the old Rail Corp. and 8 months as new NZ Rail
Ltd.) revenue continued the trend of the 1980’s and in real terms it
fell right through to 1993.  The severity of the decline in both
freight and passenger revenue was masked somewhat by the growth
in property related revenue - they reached $100m in the 15 month
reporting period in 1989 as well as the sale of the bus passenger
business.  With the market share losses, revenue for the core freight
business fell an average 3.9% pa through this period demonstrating
just how sensitive the market was to price.
The classification of revenues from Rail Corp to NZ Rail was not
transparent and direct comparison over time is just not possible.  At
the same time Rail made changes to their financial systems that
changed the definition of the revenue that was reported.  Part period
reporting adds another layer of complexity to the results.
OP ERAT ING P ERFORMANC E - CONST ANT $000
15 mo n t hs t o  8 mo n t hs t o
30 -Jun 30 -Jun 30 -Jun 30 -Jun 30Jun
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
OPE RATIN G R E VEN UES (000's)
N Z R ail Freight 366, 977 354, 976  237,101  333,167 321, 33
Passenge r  Group 169, 618 120, 549 27 ,218 54 ,177 50450
Se aRail 90 ,365 93 ,409
Inte rIsland er 38 ,342 59 ,042 64 182
Othe r 2, 971 6, 893 31 ,829 27 ,718 29497
Prop erty 102, 499 2, 888
TOTAL O PER ATIN G  REVEN UES  732,431  578,715  334,489 474, 104  465,561
OPE RATIN G C OSTS
Pe rsonnel Costs 594, 807 384, 421 204, 654 271, 968 245, 65
D epr e ciation 93 ,735 41 ,562 11 ,399 23 ,577 26 646
M aterials Se r vice s etc 380, 969 239, 649 161, 425 211, 221 193, 30
Othe r  Costs
TOTAL O PER ATIN G  COSTS 1, 069,511 665, 632 377, 478 506, 766 465, 41
EA R NIN GS FROM OPE R ATIO NS (337,079) (86,917 ) (42,989 ) (32,662 ) 121
Cost Reductions The real improvements in operating earnings were sourced from
real reductions in the costs, mainly reductions in personnel numbers
which fell from 10,000 to 5,000 at the end of 1993.  On a
normalised basis people costs halved from 1989 to 1993, though it
should be remembered that this reduction was a mix of both fewer
people in NZ Rail Ltd. and the fact that the people not needed in the
core NZ Rail were retained in the old Rail Corp structure and as
such do not appear in this analysis after 1989.  The 1989 debt
reduction on the balance sheet was accompanied by a corresponding
reduction in asset values that manifested itself in a lower
depreciation charge to the operating statement.  The purchase value
of other materials and services also fell through the period as
operating processes, maintenance levels and the like were reviewed
and costs reduced.  Again a portion of these costs were left in the
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old Rail Corp. in 1989.  It should also be noted that by 1989 rail no
longer received direct subsidies for it passenger operations from
central government though regional local body support was
maintained in Auckland and Wellington and is reported as
passenger revenues.
Revenue Growth It was clear that in 1989 rail management understood that, to
survive, they had to tackle the market share and revenue losses as
well as improve their earnings position with at least cost reductions
that matched the revenue losses.  With privatisation as an objective
they needed a core rail business that would be attractive to potential
buyers however, in its first year to June 1991, NZRL experienced a
financial operating loss that persisted until 1993.
Restructuring Costs The period of financial restructuring to 1993 also included
significant redundancy costs.  These costs were either actual cash
costs paid to staff who left NZ Rail or were accounting provisions
taken into the balance sheet to cover future staff reductions.  At the
time NZ Rail was sold the redundancy provision in the balance
sheet was $69m and a total of $438 million (constant 1997$) had
been paid to reduce staff levels.
Cost Models One of the direct consequences of management seeking a strong
market segment focus was the development of detailed economic
cost models to better understand their cost structures in the
competitive environment.   Those models made management aware
of their cost disadvantages.  The price levels that result from these
basic cost differences seem to be the fundamental reason why rail
continued to lose market share and had declining revenues through
this period. It was not until the privatisation period that the cost
structure of the core freight business was reduced to a level that
allowed rail to successfully compete across a number of market
segments.
Contribution With rail starting to focus on yield management of the freight
business previous management change is reflected in the form of
improved contribution to fixed and common costs.  By 1993 it
seems that the contribution per NTK from Bulk Goods had
improved from a small negative to a small positive sum, and Export
Goods also improved.
In this analysis, incremental costs are those costs that are avoidable
if the particular activity is discontinued.  In that regard they are
most useful for performance analysis.  They are not strictly
marginal, in a network business the marginal cost of 1 more output
unit is extremely small and an increase of 1 unit is not generally
applied, rather an increment of capacity is added.  Rail update their
incremental cost models annually based on a thorough review of
their current cost structures.
Passengers Passenger contributions are not as readily available for this period,
financial models of direct costs had not been developed for the
individual rail passenger.
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1990 Restructure In 1989 Rail Corp had liabilities exceeding $1.4 billion and virtually
no shareholders funds.  This represented the culmination of their
operating losses and the funding requirements of their capital
programme.  Rail Corp management sought Government assistance
with restructuring the Corporation to allow the core freight business
to perform as they felt it could and to facilitate its sale if that was
desirable.  The 1989/90 financial and organisational restructure was
implemented in two stages, the first was a $360m equity injection
by the Government in 1989 that was accompanied by a guarantee of
the debt and the second saw the creation of NZ Rail Ltd. in October
1990 and the retention of the $1.1 billion of debt as well as land and
non core businesses in the balance sheet of the old NZ Rail
Corporation.  NZ Rail Limited’s balance sheet was simple, made up
of core rail assets at $102m in value and shareholders equity to fund
them plus the current portion of both assets and liabilities.
The assets themselves were written down by approximately $1.0b, with the values of
permanent ways, bridges, electrification and land and buildings
making up most of the write down.
1994 to 1997 - Post Privatisation
Success The financial performance of NZ Rail/Tranz Rail since privatisation
is represented as a success story.  It has had a lot of exposure both in
NZ and overseas (interest in Tranz Rail performance has come from
UK, Australia, USA as well as less developed countries).  The
performance in this period follows from the stability that is now
evident in their market share and revenues.  While their share of
market volumes has stopped falling, prices have continued to fall in
most of the freight segments but in real terms both freight and
passenger segment revenues have reversed the long term trend.
Overall real revenue growth has averaged 6% pa over the period,
resulting from strong growth in freight volumes that were supported
by small improvements from rail passengers and a healthy 8.5% pa
increase in InterIslander revenues.
OPERATING PERFORMANCE - CONSTANT $ 000
1994 1995 1996 1997
OPERA TING REVENUES (000's)
TranzRa i l-  Fre ight 349,085 386,703 402,942 404,900
Pa ssenger Group 53,798 60,266 63,453 66,700
InterIslander 67,803 75,544 82,258 85,100
Other 20,445 40,851 26,210 22,688
TOTAL OPERATING
R EVEN UES
491,130 563,364 574,862 579,388
OPERA TING COS T S
Personnel Cost s 225,962 208,303 213,783 214,539
Depreciat ion 24,555 26,633 27,343 28,994
Materials Services etc 193,246 224,770 226,587 236,591
Other Cos ts 2,226 3,043 6,447 15,682
TOTAL OPERATING COSTS 445,989 462,750 474,161 495,806
EARNINGS FROMOPERATIONS 45,141 100,614 100,701 83,582
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Cost Management As a consequence of decisions to further improve operating
performance, personnel costs were reduced in real terms but there
was a small increase in total costs.  The productivity analysis in
Stage 2 of this review would look at the consequences of this in
more detail.  Also in keeping with the increasing level of capital
investment, depreciation grew over the period.
Cost Models In parallel with their operational cost reductions, Tranz Rail has
further improved their understanding of the cost structure of the
freight business through continual development of their incremental
cost models.  This capability is particularly targeted at supporting
pricing decisions in their market segment business units.  Their
efforts at understanding and reducing costs and therefore their direct
competitiveness has also improved significantly.
Passengers Passenger contributions show that the performance of these services
has quite obviously improved.  Although the approach to identifying
shared passenger costs (as opposed to directly avoidable
incremental costs) has an element of arbitrariness in the allocation
of costs, there is a significant and consistent positive trend in the
financial performance of passenger services.
InterIslander The revenue and expenses for InterIslander services include both
passengers and commercial vehicles because, from 1994 expenses
were combined and are not available for these services individually.
Note also that these contributions are at the level of individual
services and do not include the overhead costs associated with
managing the passenger business unit.
Turnaround The financial turnaround of the rail business has been achieved
because of a marketing strategy that was born from a strong
management desire to see the core freight business as successful,
and a financial restructuring to remove a legacy of debt from the
balance sheet.  Success in the market came from a better
understanding of the customer strategies necessary to succeed, and
the selection of the people and tools to make it happen. An essential
element in the process has been an understanding of the cost levels
that were required to compete in each segment and the tactics of
getting costs to those levels.
Rail Efficiency
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10 Railway Efficiency
Although efficiency and productivity will be reviewed in depth in Stage 2 it is useful to
consider some basic productivity indicators.
  Asset Utilisation
Wagons The core hardware of the freight business is wagons.  The
programme to rationalise and modernise the wagon fleet has
dramatically reduced the number of wagons from 25,750 in 1983 to
7,280 in 1997 (a reduction of 75%).  The intention has been not
only to bring the size of the wagon fleet more in line with the
amount of freight being carried by the business, but to be more
responsive to the market and the needs of the customers by
constructing wagons suited to carrying their products as efficiently
as possible. While the number of wagons decreased significantly
between 1983 and 1997, the net tonnes carried in 1996 was similar
to that in 1983.  The total number of wagons and thousands of net
tonnes carried are shown in the graph below.
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Utilisation One measure of utilisation of the wagon fleet is the ratio of net
tonne kilometres to wagon capacity.  An index of this ratio shows
that the utilisation of the wagon fleet increased significantly over
the period 1983-1997, as illustrated in the graph below.
Wagon utilisation index      
(NTK/wagon capacity)
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Train Size & Speed At the same time as the size of the wagon fleet was declining, train
sizes were increasing.  Between 1983 and 1995, the average net
train size increased nearly 30% from 263 tonnes to 339 tonnes.  The
number of mainline locomotives decreased from 324 to 193 over the
same period. As noted previously, the amount of freight being
carried has not changed significantly over this period; however,
these figures indicate it is being carried with less labour, and lower
operating and maintenance costs.
  Productivity
NTK/Employee The principal measure of productivity used by Rail themselves is
NTK per employee which has improved dramatically since 1983.
The improvement was gradual between 1983 and 1987, but was
subsequently more rapid as the impact of the staff redundancies and
capital investment took effect.  Revenue earned per employee has
also improved, doubling from $50,000 in 1983 to $100,000 in 1996
(in 1997 dollars).
The chart below shows NTK per freight employee as a productivity
index.
NTK/freight employee index
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11 Privatisation of NZ Rail and the IPO
The Basis for Privatisation
SOE’s New Zealand state owned limited liability companies are now
generally identified with the State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) that
were created during the reform period of the mid-late 1980s under
the SOE Act of 1986 (see Robert Cameron and Stephen Jennings
(1987, pp.124-127) for a detailed chronology).  The principles for
trading operations are encapsulated in the SOE Act of 1986.  Each
SOE is to function as a limited liability company. Management is to
have standard commercial objectives, subject to the caveat of the
contents of a Statement of Corporate Intent that has to be approved
by the government each year.  It sets corporate policy for the ensuing
two years and other matters to do with facilitating monitoring. The
Act provides for a Board of Directors accountable to the minister of
finance and another minister, who hold the shares.
SOE Limitations Because SOEs are subject to the same competition laws facing
private enterprises and have no contracts giving preferential access
to government procurement or finance, an SOE is on a similar
footing to privately-owned firms. They differ in a number of
respects. These include the fact that their limited liability status is
not entirely credible: it is unlikely that the Government will let a
major SOE fail. This both reduces incentives for prudent
management and the cost of capital to these firms. SOEs do not have
traded shares and thus are not monitored by the range of equity
holders and analysts that scrutinise private sector company
performance.  Also, non-tradability of SOE shares limits the range of
incentive contracts that are available to reward managers: these
cannot include equity options, for example.
The SOEs’ ongoing relationship to government, albeit much weaker
than that of a government department, affects their focus on business
performance. First, the possibility of the introduction of non-
business objectives is ever present and this reduces concentration on
business by SOEs: in the jargon of economics, it is simply very hard
to make the business objective function of SOEs time consistent.
Secondly, the government can, and does in fact, influence
investment and other decisions through the statement of corporate
intent and its ownership. This influence detracts from the pursuit of
business objectives subject to the provisions of competition statutes.
Thirdly, the appointments process for board members of SOEs can
result in directors that may take more cognisance of political issues
than would those appointed in the private sector (although the SOE
Act is specific about the qualities of directors). These are all
impediments to company efficiency for which there are preferable
ways of handling in the private sector: they thus provide arguments
for privatising SOEs.
Rail Ownership New Zealand Railways Corporation was incorporated as a limited
liability company in 1983. Despite the arrival of the SOE Act in
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1987, it was never converted to SOE status under this Act but was
monitored as per the State owned Enterprises Act.  NZ Rail Corp
had the efficiency impediments of SOEs under the 1986 Act, plus
other difficulties.  Its governance structure included the Board being
appointed directly by the government of the day, and the
“controlling” minister and the minister to whom the board was
accountable was one and the same.  This intimate link between the
company and the politicians affected the appointment of directors
exacerbated the time consistency problem and affected the
investment decisions that were taken.  This was heightened by the
fact that railways had been used for all sorts of educational and
social programmes in the past. In short, we would expect railways
efficiency levels to improve at least as much from privatisation as
would standard SOEs under the 1986 Act.
So what of the process
1988 – The Start Early evidence of the desire for sale of Railways Corporation of NZ
is available from mid 1988 and is public information from 1989, by
which time the company were openly planning for a sale, possibly in
late 1992.  Management designed privatisation business plans exist
from 1989 and at that time external advice had been sought on
getting Rail Corp ready for sale.  It appears from the research that
privatisation was the real reason behind the creation of NZ Rail Ltd.,
planned in 1989 and implemented in 1990.  The Board and
management wanted to shed government ownership and run a
genuinely commercial railway.  Their frustrations with state
ownership are evident in both their business plans and other
documentation.
Strategy Although rail did not make a financial surplus (in real terms) from its
operations until 1993, it had the potential to do so.  A minimum of
both capital and labour resources had been included in the new
structure, so costs were low, operations had the mandate to make
them lower.  Meanwhile the marketing units had the strategy to
secure volume growth in all markets but more especially in bulk
commodities where cost efficiencies would improve financial
contributions.  Management had also identified several value-added
strategies in freight handling, especially door to door and
refrigerated road transport, where it is anticipated that revenues
would be higher despite higher costs of handling.
Value added was also designed to flow from developments in the
area of customer service (info on freight and billing) and electronic
data handling.
Privatisation Process
By the time NZ Rail Ltd. was formally put up for sale the NZ
Government had developed a well established sale process, as
follows
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Sale Process
decide to consider selling asset
→obtain private sector advice on process
→undertake scoping study
→consider regulatory/social issues
→decide to sell
→decide on transaction
The sale transaction itself was by a two-stage process open tender
that sought to maximise sale price.
Scoping Studies The first government scoping study was commissioned in 1990
(A.T. Kearney, CS First Boston, 31.7.92) and followed close on the
heels of two BAH 1989 studies that had carefully considered the
long term viability of NZ Rail core business on a stand-alone basis.
Their first report defined what resources would be needed in the
stand-alone core business after making two assumptions about when
some form of competitive equilibrium was reached in the market and
that rails cost structure was efficient.  BAH envisaged a core
business of about 5000 employees that needed about $100m pa of
capital expenditure to support its operations.  They also identified
that $300m in cash would need for redundancies and to upgrade
some assets over the following 2 years.  On the basis that NZ Rail
Ltd. was more or less set up this way, it seems that BAH’s advice
was acted on by NZ Rail Corp. and the government.
The second report was a detailed analysis of the competitive status
of the core business and the steps/strategy needed to make it viable.
BAH projected a positive operating cash flow from 1992 and
recommended tactics to meet the financial objectives.
The scoping study recommended that government sell immediately
but noted that the price may be less than it otherwise would be
because of various cash flow risks. The scoping study highlighted
that the core rail business had positive economic value but in the
short term there was doubt about how competitive conditions would
evolve, and therefore cash flows were regarded as risky.  BAH’s
prediction that $300m was needed for extraordinary costs was
assigned as devaluing the business for potential purchasers.   The
government chose to restructure Rail Corp, defer privatisation and,
between 1990 and 1992, two further scoping studies were
undertaken to determine the return maximising time to sell.   In late
1992 the decision to proceed was taken and Bankers’ Trust were
selected as government advisors for the sale.  They proceeded to
short list potential bidders.  These are thought to have included:
• Wisconsin Central/Berkshire Partners consortium (Tranz
Rail)
• Sea Containers
• Ports of Wellington/Sofrana consortium
• Ports of Tauranga/Lyttleton Pacifica consortium
• Freightways/Noel group
• Mainfreight
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Wisconsin Bid It appears that three serious bids were received by the government,
Wisconsin, a combined ports consortium and Freightways.  The
$400m successfully bid by the Wisconsin consortium in September
1993 was the only “clean” unconditional offer and $328.3m of the
cash went to the government for all the shares in NZ Rail Limited
and $71.7m to retire debt.
Shareholding following Privatisation
The share ownership of Tranz Rail Holdings remained in private
hands through to June 1996, although there were some changes to
the number of shares on issue and to the proportion owned by the
original consortium members.   The following table describes the
ownership structure.
Shareholding Structure % of total
Sept 93 June 94 June 95 June 96 June 97
Wisconsin Central 27.3 26.7 31.3 22.7 22.5
Fay Richwhite 31.8 31.1 28.2 20.4 19.2
Berkshire Assoc 27.3 26.7 25.2 18.3 5.4
Public/Other 9.1 8.9 8.0 30.4 43.8
David Lloyd 4.6 4.4 4.0 2.9 2.9
Management 0 2.2 3.2 5.2 5.5
Staff/Directors 0 0 0 0 0.6
Total Share on Issue – m 114.7 121.8 95.1 126.8 127.6
Share Price $6.88 $8.5
IPO
Public Offer On 22 May 1996 Tranz Rail Holdings issued a prospectus offering
27 million ordinary shares for sale to the public at a price of $6.19.
The offer was oversubscribed and a greater proportion of the
companies shares went into public ownership.
Counterfactual
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12 Counterfactual: In General
Overview In the case of Tranz Rail the counterfactual can be  defined as the
most likely scenario that would have occurred if privatisation had
not taken place. A counterfactual experience is required in order to
assess the economic efficiency of the privatisation process. It is
used for comparison with measured actual performance in order to
assess the welfare change that are attributable to the change from
government ownership to private ownership.  There are various
generic sources of uncertainty that can affect the outcome in any
study of privatisation.
Firstly, the counterfactual is necessarily an estimate based on
judgement and therefore there is uncertainty about its specification
and company performance under it.
Secondly, there is uncertainty about the performance of the
privatised company due to its management: the fact that point
estimates are used to calculate actual performance means that it may
suffer/benefit from random outcomes. Examples include data
measurement errors and performance-affecting factors such as the
state of the economy at the time of privatisation. Because any
individual study will be affected by these random inputs, it is only
over a number of studies that a complete empirical picture of the
welfare effects of privatisation will emerge.
Two comparisons There are two sorts of counterfactual. The first entails comparison
with other railway companies or entities. In common with the case
of most privatised industries in New Zealand, there are no New
Zealand railways that can serve as benchmarks. The are data on the
performance of railways in other countries that would provide some
comparative information. Such analysis would contribute to our
understanding of the performance of New Zealand rail, but the
absence of a common economic environment would limit
conclusions that could be drawn.
New Zealand railways is different from most other railways.  It is
smaller, reflecting market size.  It has a narrow gauge with low
capacity wagons and short trains.  These characteristics render
benchmark comparisons with best-practice railways – such as
certain of those in North America – limited for the purpose of
comparisons.
The second approach is to construct a New Zealand counterfactual
with which the actual performance of New Zealand rail can be
compared. It is this latter approach that we are evaluating for the NZ
Railway’s privatisation, although we would seek to use cross-
country comparisons where the relevant data are readily obtained
and germane to the comparison. Initial investigation has revealed
data that will be of limited use for this purpose.
Rail Privatisation Consider the privatisation timeline set out in the next figure. For
illustrative purposes only, the figure incorporates a slow rate of
improvement in the entity as a government department that is
73
represented by the bottom, solid line, improvements in performance
with each organisational change, starting with corporatisation. At
the time of evaluation we see from the figure that performance gains
at the date of evaluation, Te, will be due to performance growth
that:
• Would have occurred anyway,
• Was due to corporatisation,
• Was due to commitment to privatisation, and
• Was due to implementation of privatisation.
Welfare The diagram indicates the importance of establishing the
counterfactual (e.g. government department, or SOE) and the
performance of the counterfactual entity; but it is a significant
abstraction from what is really required. What is not apparent from
the diagram is that the comparison should be based on welfare
enhancement, not simply on productive efficiency, or x-efficiency,
that is a component of welfare. Welfare enhancement will require
incorporating output market welfare changes, and this will entail
catering for market changes over time. For an extreme example,
suppose that the privatised firm was more productive (in terms of x-
efficiency) than its counterfactual (an SOE say), but that because of
market changes it was not viable. In this case, despite the
productivity improvement, it would not be in society’s interest –
absent external effects – for the company to remain in operation:
there would be no welfare gain to its continued existence.  Thus,
application to New Zealand Rail must embody in the counterfactual
the market changes that have taken place. The specific
counterfactual is mooted in the next final section.
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12.1 Measurement of Welfare
Approach The approach for the measurement of welfare is, in general terms,
that of the ex-post “cost-benefit analysis” methodology that is more
or less that which is described in the Review of Methodologies for
Estimating the Welfare Impacts of Corporatisation and
Privatisation (the Review) that was prepared for the New Zealand
Treasury in 1997. There are New Zealand Rail specific
characteristics that are not addressed by The Review, but which are
critically important to an evaluation of the privatisation of New
Zealand Rail. In particular, these include multiple outputs, matters
of output market structure and dynamic change in these markets.
Output Markets The previous analysis has defined 7 classes of outputs (see the
product-flow diagram of section 7).  They differ in that each has it
own characteristics (passenger, handling requirement,
distance/volume requirement) that mean that they are not close
substitutes. The key characteristics of these outputs are that each
falls into one of two market structures. These are now described.
Evidence presented in previous sections is that other modes of
transport are vigorously contestable markets in their own right and
that they provide the benchmark competition for much of rail’s
product. In this discussion, road transport is used as an example of
constant average and marginal cost industrial competition that
would be expected of an almost competitive market.
The two proposed markets are illustrated by the following simple
diagram of a competitive fringe.
1.1 Market
Structure
proad=mcroad=acroad
prail
mcrail
qrail
Quantity
Price/cost
Rail Demand Curve
Rail Marginal
Revenue Curve
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In the market structure diagram the cost curve for other modes of
transport – road is the example - is flat and therefore represents a
constant cost industry. This is reasonable since there are arguably
no congestion costs over this period in the modes of transport. The
demand curve facing rail has a kink because of the competitive
fringe that is provided by road transport. As it is depicted in the
diagram, there is a little market power for rail.  It depends upon the
elasticity of demand beyond the kink.
There is a welfare gain to the existence of rail over road transport
because of the assumed lower marginal cost of rail in this market. It
consists of the lower resource use that is characteristic of rail in this
diagram and the willingness to pay (less the cost) for the extra
output generated by the lower cost of rail transport. If it is assumed
that the output is quite inelastic1, as seems reasonable for
intermediate products, then the extra output will be very small and
the price set by rail will be negligibly below that of road transport.
In this case, welfare resulting from the presence of rail in this
market will simply be the economic profit of rail.
Now, for a market segment for which rail has no cost advantage,
then mcrail=mcroad=acroad and there will be no economic profit for
rail in that segment. Furthermore, there will be no welfare gain
from rail’s participation in that market. The model of a perfectly
competitive market has to be viewed as a very crude approximation:
if it was exactly correct then either rail would not compete in that
market or rail would have all of the market.
In reality, there will be some product variation on diminishing
returns that enable rail to exist in part of the market. In product
variety models welfare can be estimated from hedonic price indices
that express price as a function of product characteristics. However,
for rail competing with other modes of transport the estimation of
such indices will not be possible. Firstly, the indices would have to
be estimated from all participants on an individual operator basis, in
the market and these data are not available. Secondly, even if they
were available many of them – such as timeliness - are not
quantitatively measurable. Hedonic indices therefore, are not
estimable. Product variety will be indicated by various measures,
and qualitative conclusions drawn about it. Nevertheless, to the
extent that improvements in product quality provide welfare in
excess of that provided by their competitors in the markets taken to
be almost perfectly competitive, welfare changes will be
quantitatively under estimated.
In sum, the 7 markets will be placed in two categories:
• one that is taken to be (almost) perfectly competitive, and
• the second wherein a competitive fringe is assumed.
In both cases welfare will be indicated by profit buttressed
qualitatively by indicators of product variety.
                                                
1 Note that this inelasticity should not be construed as inelasticity to rail per se: because of the fringe competition,
rail faces a very elastic demand for its output.
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The welfare assessment of privatisation will, of course, be affected
by the counterfactual.
Calculation The productivity study would subtract the rate-of-growth in
aggregate output from the rate-of-growth of input use [see Boles de
Boer and Evans (1996)]. It would seek to estimate the marginal
costs of the outputs (though these would not be reported) to
construct an output aggregate (Fuss 1994) and it would aggregate
inputs using the standard index (dual) methodology.
There will be issues to solve in constructing the capital stock series,
especially given that the core rail business was in the 1980s
combined with other activities. Nevertheless, it is considered that
reasonable capital stock figures may be constructed. There will be
the issue of the embodiment of technological change: while it will
not be as acute as for telecommunications, it will mean that the
productivity change measure will reflect new technology as well as
organisational change.  It is difficult to separate these two.  In the
case of Tranz Rail, new technology  was adopted before and after
privatisation.
Following the previous justification, the welfare change over time
will be measured by the real economic surplus over time, calculated
using the estimated capital stock. It will be adjusted by the (either
annualised or valued at the date Te) of redundancy and investment
payments. The redundancy payments will be included as a cost to
represent some compensation for employees earnings in the
company.  This approach is justified on the assumption that these
payments induced employees to leave the company.
Cost-benefit analysis is essentially a comparative-static
methodology.  This will be manifest in the static snapshots that will
be compared.  The investment data will help determine a measure
of the capital stock at points of comparison, but to include it as a
cost as well, would be to double count.  It will be interesting and
useful however to evaluate the development of the company for sale
(1989-1993) in which case the sum invested will be of direct
relevance.
The final welfare measure will be assessed against counterfactual
scenarios that are proposed in the final section of this report.
Other Issues In addition to the welfare calculations, there needs to be considered
whether subsets of economic agents benefitted or lost differentially
from the privatisation of New Zealand rail and the impact on the
government.
Differential Effects Differential effects are only of direct relevance to consumers of
final goods.  They can arise from income effects, or consumption
decisions.
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New Zealand rail provides freight and passenger transport. Freight
is an intermediate good the cost of which is distributed through to
final prices in myriad ways. The implications of changing transport
prices for final goods prices would be a major research exercise in
itself, and yet it is only the effect of final consumption or
investment goods prices that is of interest for questions of
incidence. Also, it is noteworthy that the market for rail freight is,
following the earlier assessment, competitive in many markets. The
existence of close substitutes means that the performance of
railways has negligible implications for incidence.
For passenger transport there are also very close substitute modes of
travel and thus, while passenger transport is often a final
consumption good, the performance of rail will not materially affect
the welfare of rail passengers. Certainly, the long distance and
urban passenger travel has close substitutes. In fact, even the inter-
island passenger traffic also has existing and potential close
substitutes that appear to constrain pricing. It also makes up a very
small proportion of rail business.
A proportion of the shares are held by foreign owners and they are
traded on a US stock exchange. While, this entails remittance of
profits overseas, there need not be any implications for New
Zealand’s foreign exchange position given that the company was
sold in a competitive tender.   More on this in stage 2.
Gov’t Cash The final study will report on the implications of the privatisation
for the government’s fiscal position    More on this in stage 2.
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13 Stage 1 Conclusions and Recommendations
The stage 1 analysis in this report reveals a story that can be simply captured in a chain of
events, as follows;
• deregulation led to:
→market share collapse 1983 to 1993, led to;
→financial crisis in 1988, led to;
→decision in 1988/89 to privatise; and
→financial & organisational restructuring in 1989/90, led to;
→privatisation in 1993, concurrent with;
→improved qualitative and financial
 performance
The market, financial and productivity indicators tell part of the story.  By themselves
however they do not capture the true the state of Rail in 1988, nor do they adequately relate
how the decision to privatise was made or the real forces that were behind the sale.  For these
we draw on assessments in 1988/89 and a range of events of the 1988-1993 period.
The History of the Privatisation of NZ Rail Ltd
This history is substantially based on material from interviews with
people who were central to the sales process.
The Start The first privatisation discussions emerged from NZ Rail’s Board
in 1988 when two members of the Board and advisors started work
on whether it was possible to privatise Rail and how to do it.  One
director, in particular was very keen on the sale option and while
the Board’s focus was on the commercialisation of rail they worked
as if privatisation, was to take place. A private Board committee
was formed to further the idea.  At this time a presentation to the
Board emphasised the design of incentives for senior managers that
would focus them on preparation for privatisation.  There is no
evidence of such contracts: although senior managers’ contracts
over the 1990-1993 period did include bonuses that increased with
profit levels that exceeded forecast profits.  Of course, the prospect
of privatisation did provide senior managers with a probability of
very rewarding contracts upon privatisation if their services were
retained.
Key senior management was not galvanised at this stage and they
continued to assess the privatisation benefits over a period of time.
A person was employed to advise on the communications and
political strategies to do with privatisation.   The period between
1988 and 1992 was devoted to preparing for the sale, in particular a
lot of time was spent on property rights (land access and rights of
way) as well as selling the non core businesses, for example, buses.
An initial valuation was completed in 1989. It set a sale value of
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$250m but advisors reckoned that it would be improved if further
restructuring was done.
Two additional Board members became the key implementers of
the sale. They were to lead the process of explaining the options to
politicians, evaluating the risks and convincing the Minister that the
business case for sale was viable.
Political Change The change of government in the 1990 election was material.  In
1991 CEOs of SOEs were informed that the impetus for
privatisation was reduced.  Treasury, who had taken a lot of
convincing that a sale was viable, had a change in personnel and it
was more difficult to get the new government to accept
privatisation.  The government was very concerned that rail was not
viable and that therefore it would end up underwriting problems
when they occurred.  Indeed this point of view was present just
before the sale.  The CS First Boston and AT Kearny report (1992)
spent a lot of space evaluating the (potential) rundown of railways,
and indicating that anticipated cash flows were very sensitive
indeed to prospects.
CEO & Strategy It was about this time (1990) that NZ Rail developed their
customer/market focus approach.  Some of the negative views of
privatisation may have been a significant in the further development
of the market strategy and tipping senior executives over to
commitment to privatisation..  One visited USA railroads that had
successfully implemented similar marketing strategies and returned
to convince management and the owners, that these strategies
would produce a financially viable outcome.
Management It was also at this time (1990) that senior executives became
“engaged” in the privatisation idea, they had gone along with it to
that point but were more committed when they saw a way of
reducing government control and the concomitant frustrations. A
Rail manager was pivotal to the success of the sale.  He was very
heavily involved in resolving the critical property rights issues.
Various of the people interviewed consider that there were two key
factors in the success of the sale; convincing the politicians that the
risk was with the buyers and management, and getting management
engaged and committed to its success.  A large amount of work was
done on the optimum structure of management incentives and a
detailed package was put to the Board in early 1993.  It is clear
from the evidence of the interviewees that without the incentive of
private ownership and the financial incentives to senior
management, the performance changes witnessed from the early
1990’s would not have occurred, there were simply weaker
incentives to make them happen under public ownership.
Skill Levels Throughout the 1989-1993 period rail continued to have skill
problems with the assembly and analysis of strategy and tactical
options.  A lot of skilled outside help was used in the 1990/93
period to evaluate strategy – much of it came from Fay Richwhite.
BAH were out of it by this stage because their role as operating
consultants was over.
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Strategy Again A strong debate emerged during the 1990/93 period as to which
business model Rail should adopt to be successful after the sale.
One view was that Rail should fill the line haul portion of the
freight moving transaction and the depot to door portion should be
carried out by the freight forwarders.  This model would cement the
position of the freight forwarder as the owner of the customer
interface.  Alan Gibbs put a bid together on this basis but under
open bidding it was valued lower than the alternative.  The other
view was advocated by Fay Richwhite.  It was that rail could just as
well provide the customer with an end to end integrated service and
own the customer interface in their own right.
In this alternative, Fay Richwhite argued that the freight forwarding
industry is an arbitrage operation and will only exist as long as the
end to end freight movers (rail and road) allow them to be there.
Recent history has established this point, Tranz Rail appear to be
successful in freight movements via their distribution unit that was
part of the forwarding industry. Tranz Rail’s internal business unit,
termed the “kombi” unit, is a term used for the group who transport
freight over long distances, for the freight forwarding industry.
Tranz Rail’s kombi unit interfaced with the freight forwarding
industry and volumes there are now declining significantly.
Decision The decision to privatise was simple in the end, management were
convinced late in 1988-89 and the government had two
preconditions to be covered: political risk and potential financial
problems in the future. In late 1992 they were convinced that there
were strategies to minimise these risks, and the decision to actually
privatise was taken.
This history is important for documenting the origins of incentives
for senior managers, and risks for government that attended the full
privatisation process.  These affect the counterfactual.
13.1 The Counterfactual
Summary The situation for New Zealand rail is summarised in the following
table of key characteristics.
The State of Rail
Characteristic 1983 1989 1992 1993-
Operating Surplus (accounting) $(214m) $(42) $(32) $0-100m
Market Strategy No No Yes Yes
Stable Market Share No No No Yes
Cost/efficient rail & rolling stock No Yes Yes Yes
Labour input (number employed) 20,000 8,000 4,800 4,800
Customer information systerms No No Yes Yes
Separate Core Business No No Yes Yes
Management Incentives Weak Weak Strong Very Strong
Assessment of downside risk Extermely
high
Extremely
high
Very
high
Moderately
high
More specifically:
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• Competition in 1983 was met by massive investment in rolling
stock, the rail network and by labour force downsizing.
• By 1989 there was an efficient network but weakness in
managerial personnel, no market orientated strategic plan,
overstaffing and no stable position in the market.
• The (privatisation) programme embarked on in 1989 resulted in
a customer orientated strategic plan that included investment in
customer systems and yield management of market segments. It
entailed additional staff reductions.
• In 1992 the market share and operating surplus had not
stabilised, and yield management was still not well developed.
There were signs that the market share and operating surplus
would stabilise. Personnel costs were down. The down side
risk, entailing the run-down of rail, remained as a real concern
(it was regarded as such a possibility that analysis of a run-
down was a central part of CS First Boston, &A. T. Kearney
1992. This report also assessed the prospective cash flow as
risky and rail management’s forecasts as optimistic ).
• Throughout its history New Zealand railways has had corporate
and board structures introduced at times of poor commercial
performance. Typically these have led to improved
management.  Always – excepting the 1983-1993 period –
reversion to departmental control has taken place with an
accompanying deteriorating commercial performance.
There is clear evidence that the decision to prepare New
Zealand Rail for privatisation was taken in 1988/89: in 1988
there was a Board presentation that focussed on a perceived
need for privatisation and that raised the need for appropriate
incentives for senior managers. Viable privatisation was the
basis for the capital injections over the 1989-93 period and the
form adopted for the company structure of 1990. Prospective
privatisation of the core rail business led to the customer focus
of 1989-1993, and sharpened (prospective) incentives for
management. Throughout this period there was a struggle to get
rail to the status of a viable business, and there were alternative
views of its prospects.
The choice of counterfactual must be influenced by these
factors as well as the performance of companies owned by
government. In reaching the choice of counterfactual, the
following points were most influential.
1. Although cost reductions and a degree of modernisation had
been achieved, the status quo from 1989 would not have been a
viable business. Fixing the status quo as of this date would
mean comparing the path that took place with a counterfactual
of no railway.
2. The investment in electronic customer systems and the
development of yield management (which had not reached
maturity by 1992) over the period 1989-93 would have been
necessary for rail survival.
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3. The prospect of privatisation provided a (potentially rewarding)
goal for management and probably brought necessary
developments forward in time.
4. Given its markets, there is no reason why rail would have
performed better under public ownership.
5. The decision to privatise together with the accompanying
(potential) incentives would stimulate performance changes of
themselves (Beesley and Littlechild, 1992:38).
6. The data of Orr (1981, 25) suggest that the business
performance (working expenses/gross earnings) of rail
improved under corporate and board structures, but that the
longest period that it maintained the more efficient performance
was 6 years, and more often it was two years before
performance began to deteriorate.
7. While private ownership (with the incentives of share-
ownership) is the best way to lock in gains made, when the
decision to implement privatisation was finally taken in late
1992 the distinct possibility of private sector run-down of the
railways was considered.
Counterfactual There is no basis to pinpoint the extent to which NZ Rail,
without the incentive of privatisation, would have attained the
performance level of 1993 and beyond. However, even if it
attained the 1993 level of performance, there is plenty of
evidence that it would not maintain this level. These arguments
suggest that two counterfactuals may be proposed:
• Break even from 1993, and
• Deterioration to break even point from the 1993 position after,
say, 4 years.
In addition, the economic efficiency of the decision in 1988 to
embark on the privatisation course of action, as opposed to
shutting down rail, should be evaluated. This would entail
incorporation of any externalities from the shutdown of
railways.
13.2  Recommendations
The issues in defining a counterfactual are the same as in any study of this sort.  The data for
the completion of Stage 2 are assessed to be available, although work is required to assemble
them and cast them in a useable form.  The availability of data and relevant information is as
comprehensive and detailed as could be anticipated.  Confidentiality will be able to be
preserved while presenting the results in an informative, but aggregative, manner.
It is recommended that stage 2 be conducted.  The framework for stage 2 is indicated in the
section (4.3.1) that sets out the approach to welfare analysis.
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